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Miller: Miller: Plea of Double Jeopardy in Missouri

THE PLEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN MISSOURI
(Continued from the April Issue)
RICHARD W. MImLER*

VI. DISCHARGE

Op THE JuIY BEFORE

A

VERDIcT IS ENTERED

At early common law in England the discharge of the jury in a criminal
proceeding for any reason, after the case had advanced to such a state that
jeopardy had attached, but before a verdict of an acquittal of the accused,
operated as a perpetual discharge of the prisoner."' This ancient practice,
however, could not withstand the exigencies of justice and has been
greatly relaxed and modified until the general modern rule is that the court
may discharge a jury where the ends of justice will be better served by
allowing the discharge.1 '
The discretion which lies within the breast of the court to discharge
the jury is said to be one which must be based on manifest necessity." In
the absence of manifest necessity the defendant may demand that the
discharge of the jury be considered as an acquittal of the offense charged
and thus a bar to a subsequent prosecution for that same offense."'
Whenever the accused confesses his guilt in open court, there no longer
exists the necessity for the jury to bring in a verdict. 3 ' In such a situation,
the jury may be lawfully discharged, without the discharge operating as a

perpetual dismissal of the offense charged."'

*Attorney, Kansas City.

130. 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 361; 2 COKE UPON LrTT r0N 227b, 3
Inst. 110.
131. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 194 (1824); United States v. Watson, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
16,651 (1868); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
132. Ibid.
133. United States v. Perez, supra n. 131; United States v. Watson, supra n.
131; Keegan, Double Jeopardy, Discharge of Jury Without "Manifest Necessity",
27 GEO. L. J. 495 (1939); Seals, "Former Jeopardy Plea No Bar Where Court
ProceedingsDismissed Due to Manifest Necessity," 2 S.C.L.Q. 183 (1949).

134. State v. Williams, 320 Mo. 296, 6 S.W.2d 915 (1928).

135. Ibid. After qualifying a panel of twelve jurors, the defendant at the

close of the opening statement for the state confessed his guilt in open court
before the court and jury and stated he was guilty as charged in the information.

The court ordered the jury to retire and then the court heard evidence relating to

(245)
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A. Failureto Arraign the Defendant
Inasmuch as the accused is not placed in jeopardy until there has been
a proper indictment or information filed, and he has been duly arraigned
before the court, the discharge of the jury for failure to arraign the accused
will not sustain a plea of prior jeopardy on a subsequent arraignment.18
Where the prosecuting attorney in open court informed the court that no
information was fied in the said cause and on the following day he came into
court and by leave of court filed an information in the case, and thereafter
an order discharging the jury was entered, this procedure was upheld by
the Supreme Court of Missouri as not placing the defendant in jeopardy a
second time.""
In the case of an appeal from a judgment of conviction of a misdemeanor in the justice of the peace court to the circuit court, the fact that
the accused was never arraigned before the justice of the peace neither
destroys the jurisdiction of the circuit court, nor does the subsequent
arraignment and trial de novo in the circuit court put the defendant twice
in jeopardy."'8
The Supreme Court of the United States has decreed that the discharge
of the jury in order to enable the accused to be again arraigned and pleaded
is clearly "within the bounds of sound judicial discretion."""

the charge and fixed the punishment at death. The defendant maintained that
after the jury was sworn, the court erred in accepting the plea of guilty in
pronouncing sentence, when in fact his plea was a plea of guilty to the court
and jury, and inasmuch as the jury was discharged without returning a verdict
and fixing a punishment, the defendant had been in jeopardy and should be held
acquitted. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated: "After the plea of guilty, no
issue remained before the court, for there was nothing to try. Defendant
judicially admitted guilt, that is, pleaded guilty to the court,-and it became the
duty of the court to fix the punishment, which was done. The plea of guilty to
the court and to the jury was tantamount to a plea of guilty to the court; the
words 'and to the jury' failing to add to or take away from the force of the
plea."
136. Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); State v. Schyhart, 199
S.W. 205 (Mo. 1917); State v. Arthur, 32 Mo. App. 24 (1888).
137. State v. Schyhart, supra note 136 at p. 209. "We conclude that the defendants could not have been in jeopardy for the reason that on the alleged
former hearing no information had been filed."
138. State v. Arthur, supra n. 136.
139. Lovato v. New Mexico, supra n. 136. Defendant was indicted for murder
and a jury was duly impaneled and sworn to hear the cause. After the
witnesses for both sides were called and sworn the court dismissed the jury on
the grounds that the defendant had not been arraigned and had not pleaded.
The accused was immediately arraigned and pleaded "not guilty," whereupon
the same jury was impaneled and the trial proceeded.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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B. End of the Term of Court
Under Section 510.320, no trial or proceeding in a criminal case is
necessarily terminated by the expiration of the term of court at which it
was commenced, but it is within the discretion of the judge to continue such
trial or proceeding in all respects as if the term had not expired or to continue the trial into a special term or into the next regular term of the
court." '° Applying this statute in the light of common law principles regarding the lawful discharge of a jury, the discharge of a jury during the
trial of a case due to the expiration of the term of court will not be a bar
to a subsequent prosecution at the next term of court.1"
0. Inability of the State to Produce Witnesses
After the jury has been duly impaneled and sworn to try a criminal
cause, the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have present sufficient
witnesses or sufficient evidence to prove the offense charged does not constitute a manifest necessity for the discharge of the jury before giving
their verdict." 2 Nor would the failure of the court to discharge the jury
in such a situation defeat the ends of public justice." '
This is an extension of the well recognized principle that in the
absence of sufficient evidence to convict, the prosecuting attorney cannot,
by any act of his own, deprive the defendant of the constitutional benefit
prohibiting a person from being twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense."' As was stated in Cornerov. United States:

140. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1949); Continuances granted on application of either
state or accused or by court of its own motion. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 545.710 (1949);
Supreme Court Rule 25.08.
141. State v. Jeffers, 64 Mo. 372 (1877).
142. Hunter v. Wade, 169 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948): "The constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy protects an accused against the second trial
where the jury in the first trial was discharged solely on the ground that
witnesses for the government were absent and therefore their testimony could
not be adduced." Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931);
State v. Webster, 206 Mo. 558, 105 S.W. 705 (1907); State ex rel. Meador v.
Williams, 117 Mo. App. 564, 92 S.W. 151 (1906).

143. Cornero v. United States, supra n. 142.
144. Cornero v. United States, supra n. 142; State ex rel. Meador v. Williams,

supra n. 142; State v. Webster, supra n. 142; Ex parte

Lange, 18 Wall. 163
(1873); Jarl v. United States, 19 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1927); United States v.

Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,279. The district attorney entered a nolle prosequi
after the jury had been impaneled and witnesses sworn, jeopardy had attached;
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 467 (7th ed. 1903).
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We are here dealing, however, with a fundamental right of a
person accused of crime guaranteed to him by the Constitution and
such right cannot be frittered away or abridged by general rules
concerning the importance of advancing public justice.1"
Since the failure of the state to produce a witness is not sufficient necessity
to warrant a discharge of the jury, whenever an accused's trial has proceeded to where jeopardy has attached, if the jury is discharged for inability of the state to produce a witness, then the accused may plead this
prior trial as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the offense charged.1 '
An example of this principle is illustrated by a prosecution for gambling
where the jury was duly impaneled and sworn and the trial proceeded with
the prosecuting attorney putting on and examining four witnesses. At the
conclusion of the testimony of these witnesses, the prosecuting attorney
by leave of court stopped the trial and withdrew the submission of the
cause from the consideration of the jury, because of the absence of a witness
of the state upon whose testimony the indictment had been found and who
had failed to attend the trial, although subpoenaed. This was done against
the objection and over the protest of the defendants. It was held that the
defendants were thereby put in jeopardy and were entitled to be discharged.4 T
To gain a better insight into this problem, consider what the effect
would be if the rule were otherwise. Every criminal trial, at once, would
be subject to numerous emergencies which would arise during its progress,
either from defect of preparation on the part of the prosecuting attorney,
insufficiency of the testimony of the witnesses, the unexpected absence of a

145. Cornero v. United States, supra n. 142.
146. Cornero v. United States, supra n. 142; State ex rel. Meador v. Williams,
supran. 142; State v. Webster, supra n. 142; Hunter v. Wade, supra n. 142.
147. State ex rel. Meador v. Williams, supra n. 142. The principles set forth
in this case were cited and approved by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the
case of State v. Webster, supra n. 142. With reference to discharge of the jury
because of insufficient evidence as constituting a bar to further proceedings, it
was stated therein: "We are unwilling, even though in some instances a guilty
man may escape punishment, to view lightly the constitutional provisions as
heretofore indicated, guaranteeing protection to the citizen. In this case we have
no hesitancy in saying that it was the duty of the trial court, upon the dis-

closure of the record now before us, to have sustained the plea of former
jeopardy interposed by the defendant and discharged him from further prosecution for the offense charged in the information." The Webster case has an
additional feature in that there was a quashing of the information filed, as well
as the discharge of the jury.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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witness or the impeachment of a witness on the part of the state. In such
a situation either the prosecuting attorney or the court would be allowed to
withdraw the case from the jury and put the defendant in jeopardy a
second time, or even a third time. The trial of a cause could be repeated
until th defendant had been so harassed that a verdict could be finally
rendered against him.
While the absence of a witness from a trial is an event which the prosecuting attorney should and could have guarded against," ' what is the
effect where a witness appears but refuses to be sworn? Is this so out of
the ordinary in the trial of an action that the prosecuting attorney could
not have been expected to foresee it? Such a distinction was made in
9
United States v. Coolidge,."
where the court held that under the circumstances the refusal of an essential witness for the prosecution to be sworn
on the ground that he had conscientious scruples against taking an oath, was
sufficient necessity to warrant the court in discharging the jury. And the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld a decision that the failure of
witnesses for the state to give testimony before a jury constituted a manifest
necessity under the law of North Carolina for withdrawing the case from
the jury and impaneling a new jury."'
D. Disqualificationof a Juror
1. Prior Service as a Grand Juror
It is the statutory law of Missouri that any person who served as a
member of a grand jury or any other inquisitorial body by which an indict-

148. United States v. Watson, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 16,651 (1868). A jury had
been duly impaneled and sworn to try a criminal case. A juror was withdrawn
and the case postponed without the defendant's consent because of the absence of
a witness for the prosecution. The court held that since it was not shown that
the absence of witnesses occurred under such circumstances to create a manifest
necessity for withdrawing a juror, discharge of the jury was equivalent to an
acquittal and the defendant could not again be tried for the same offense.
149. 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,858 (D.Mass. 1815). The case was not directly
raised on the matter of double jeopardy but was raised on the resistance of the
defendant to the prosecuting attorney's motion to discharge the jury. The court
remanded the case for trial for failure of an essential witness to take the oath,
because of conscientious scruples against taking an oath.

150. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1952).

Petitioner was indicted

and tried in a North Qarolina state court for asault with a deadly weapon. Two
witnesses for the state refused to give any testimony before the jury so the state,

contending that such testimony was essential to prove its cause, moved that the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957
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ment or presentment was found in any cause shall not serve as a petit
juror on the trial of that cause."' It has not been determined in Missouri
whether this statutory prohibition of prior service on the grand jury
renders a discharge of the juror a necessity upon the matter being known
by the court, or whether it merely raises a question of implied bias which
the accused may challenge or waive.' The Supreme Court of the United
States decided, in Thompson v. United States,"' that prior service on a
grand jury constituted a situation of manifest necessity for the discharge
of that juror from the petit jury. This decision of the Supreme Court
seems consonant with the proper sphere in which the grand jury and petit
jury operate."' Since the grand jury determines whether there are su-ficient facts presented to warrant an indictment then, if a member of the
grand jury was allowed to sit upon a jury, would not his mind also be
partial to a certain extent on the evidence presented during the trial, and

court withdraw a juror from the sworn panel and declare a mistrial. The court

did so on the grounds that it was within the discretion of the common law of
Norh Carolina to declare a mistrial and require the defendant to be presented to
another grand jury.
151. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.110 (1949). "No person who was a member of the
grand jury or inquest by which any indictment or presentment was found in any
cause shall serve as a petit juror on the trial of such cause."
152. 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 876, p. 486.
153. 155 U.S. 271 (1894). Petitioner was indicted for murder and the jury
being impaneled and sworn, the trial commenced. After the Government had
presented one witness, the court, over the objection of the defendant, discharged
the jury on the grounds that one of the jurors was disqualified to sit on account
of having been a member of the grand jury that returned the indictment in the
case. A new jury was sworn.and the trial proceeded resulting in a conviction.
In holding that the defendant was not twice put in jeopardy, the court stated
". .. courts of justice are invested with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking all of the circumstances
into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the acts or the ends of public
justice would otherwise be defeated and to order a trial by another jury; and
that the defendant is not thereby twice put in jeopardy within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
154. The reason why grand jurors are not entitled to sit as petit jurors is
found in the history of the jury system. The rationale still exists today, however. "Instead of taking separate verdicts from numerous vills and hundreds,
they selected a petty jury of twelve from among the numerous jurors present in
court, and took the verdict of these twelve. It regularly happened that at least

some of these twelve had also been members of the presenting jury for it must
be remembered that the whole principle of jury trial was to get information
useful to the Crown from those people most likely to have it-the principle of
the ancient inquisition. It is at this point that we first find signs of a rational

approach to jury trial. The indictors were under some pressure to maintain
their accusaton and a subsequent acquittal occasionally landed the indictors
themselves in prison. It is therefore clear that a prisoner could not expect a
disinterested verdict from a petty jury consisting wholly or partly of indictors."
PLUcxNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 119 (2d ed. 1936).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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thus destroy the impartiality required by the Mlissouri Constitution."'
The discharge of the jury because one of the jurors was a member of
the grand jury which found the indictment would be based on manifest
necessity, and hence a discharge under these circumstances could not be
'
pleaded as a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."
2. Bias or Prejudice of a Juror
The actual bias or prejudice of a juror is regarded as sufficient justification for the discharge of the jury without prejudicing the right of the
state to bring the accused to trial before another jury. Any bias or prejudice is a direct violation of the Mlissouri Constitution which provides that
the accused shall have the right to a "speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county."..
The purpose of this constitutional provision is to effectuate the administration of a code of justice which requires that verdicts in criminal as
well as civil suits shall be found by impartial juries as a result of honest
deliberations, absolutely free from prejudice or bias."' This constitutional
provision is equally applicable whether the juror's bias is toward the state
or toward the accused, for the public as well as the accused has rights which
must be safeguarded.""0 As it is the right of the accused to have his case
tried by an impartial jury, so also do the people have an equal right to have
their case tried by an impartial, unbiased jury."' If during the progress
of a trial it should become known to the court that some member or members
of the jury have preconceived biases or prejudices preventing them from
being impartial in the cause, it would be a travesty upon the administration
of justice to allow the case to proceed to a verdict with the result that the
accused could plead this prosecution as a bar to a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense. It is undeniable under the common law and the
Missouri Constitution that the accused has the right to a trial by a just
and impartial jury, but it is also true that the accused does not have a

155. Art. I, § 18 (a) (1945).
156. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
157. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); United States v. Morris,
26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,815 (D.Mass. 1851).
158. Art. I, § 18 (a) (1945).

159. United States v. Morris, supra n. 157.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
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vested right to a trial by a jury some member of which has obtained a place
on that jury with the express purpose either of acquitting or convicting
the accused."'
Needless to say, when a biased or prejudiced juror has obtained his
place on a jury by fraud, perjury or collusion, so as to have a specific result
reached, this also falls under the general rule that the discharge of the
jury for this reason will not prejudice the right to bring the accused to trial
before another jury."'
In addition to the constitutional provision granting the accused the
right to trial by an impartial jury, it has been enacted by the legislature
that where an indictment or information alleges an offense against the
personal property of another, neither the injured party, nor relatives of
the injured party, nor any person who is a relative of the prosecutor or
tlie defendant, shall be a competent juror in the trial of the case."0'
The discovery that a juror was acquainted with the accused prior
to the criminal proceedings being brought would also be justification for
the discharge of the jury and the impanelment of another jury to try the
accused for the same offense."' Such acquaintance destroys the absolute

162. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 546.120 (1949); United States v. Morris, supra n. 157.
"It is an entire mistake to confound this discretionary authority of the court to
protect one party of the tribunal from corruption or prejudice with the right
of challenge allowed to a party; and it is, at least equally a mistake to suppose,
that in a court of justice either party can have a vested right to corrupt a prej-

udiced juror who is not fit to sit in judgment in the case." This was also
cited in Simmons v. United States, supra n. 157.
163. There are no Missouri cases on this point. United States v. Morris, supra
n. 157. The withdrawal of a case from the jury after the jury had been impaneled and sworn and some witnesses had been examined upon a showing made
by the district attorney that one of the jurors had a definite bias in the case, was
held not to sustain a plea of former jeopardy when the jury was discharged and
defendant was again put on trial before an impartial jury.
164. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 546.120 (1949): "Where any indictment or information
alleges an offense against the person or property of another, neither the injured
party nor any person of kin to him shall be a competent juror on the trial, nor
shall any person of kin to the prosecutor or defendant in any case serve as juror
on the trial thereof."
165. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891). Petitioner was indicted
for aiding and abetting the carrying out of an embezzlement. A jury was duly
impaneled and sworn and one of the jurors stated on his voir dire that he had no
acquaintance with the accused and had never seen him to his knowledge. The
case was commenced, and witnesses were examined on behalf of the Government
until the district attorney entered an affidavit showing that the juror and the

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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impartiality which is necessary to effectuate the proper administration of
a criminal proceeding.1
Any formation or expression of opinion, that the defendant is either
guilty or not guilty, by one of the jurors before the trial has commenced
would justify a dismissal of the jury. The discharge of the jury under such
circumstances would not sustain a plea of former jeopardy by the defendant
in another trial before an impartial jury."' Also falling under this constitutional provision would be any tampering with jurors such as communication with jurors during the progress of the trial where by reason of
these outside influences brought to bear upon the juror, the jurors, or any
of them, might be subject to such bias or prejudice as not to stand as an
impartial agent between the government and the accused in the case."'

accused not only knew each other but for a while had lived next door to one

another. In this case it was held to be clearly within the authority and discretion

of the trial judge to order the jury to be discharged and put the defendant before
another jury, and that the defendant was not thereby put in jeopardy within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
166. Supra n. 165.
167. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 546.130 (1949). "Persons whose opinions are such as to
preclude them from finding any defendant guilty of an offense punishable with
death shall be ineligible to serve as jurors on a trial of an indictment or information charging any such offense, unless such disqualification is waived by
the representative of the state when selecting the jury in any such case."
Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 546.140 (1949). "No witness in any criminal case shall be
sworn as a juror therein if challenged for that cause before he is sworn; and if
any juror shall know anything relative to the matter in issue, he shall disclose
the same in open court."
Mo. RLv. STAT. § 546.150 (1949). "It shall be a good cause of challenge to a
juror that he has formed or delivered an opinion on the issue, or any material

fact to be tried, but if it appear that such opinion is founded only on rumor
and newspaper reports, and not such as to prejudice or bias the mind of the juror,
he may be sworn."
Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.160 (1949)-. "All challenges for cause may be tried by
the court, on the oath of the person challenged, or on other evidence, and such
challenges shall be made before the juror is sworn; but if the cause of challenge
be discovered after the juror is sworn, and before any part of the evidence is
delivered, he may be discharged, or not, in the discretion of the court."
There are other statutes declaring the standards of competency for a person
to sit as a juror. Mo. REv. STAT. §§496.100 and 497.200 (1949). The failure
to comply with the requisites of these statutes does not appear to warrant the
discharge of the jury on grounds of manifest necessity, since the violation of
these statutes would not go to the bias or prejudice of a juror in a particular
case.
168. United States v. Haskell, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 15,321 (E.D.Pa. 1823). Among
the illustrations given in this case as to what would constitute adequate necessity
in the dismissal of the jury, is where the prisoner had tampered with some member
of the jury.
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E. Illness or Misconduct
1. Illness of the Judge, Juror, or the Accused
Notwithstanding the general principle that a defendant in a criminal
court should not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, it lies
within the discretionary power of the trial court to discharge a duly
impaneled jury without the consent of the defendant because of the illness
of a judge, juror, or the accused himself.' These exceptions are based
on common sense and justice recognized by the law,"" and supported by
universal authority, for "sickness may come, unknown before it comes.
And if, while the cause is on trial, it falls on the judge or a juryman or the
prisoner," then the court has the power "to interrupt the proceedings
before final verdict rendered, this result shows that no jeopardy existed
in fact, though believed to exist, and the prisoner may be required to answer
anew. 2,171
This right to discharge the jury due to illness also extends to the illness
of counsel when there is no associate counsel to continue the case.""
To obtain a more complete comprehension of this situation, consider
the case wherein the accused was indicted by the grand jury in the state
criminal court for bigamy, arraigned, and entered a plea of not guilty.
After the jury was duly impaneled and sworn to try the cause, the state
proceeded, introduced evidence, and examined witnesses. On the second
day of trial they adjourned the case so that the trial of another case which
was set could be heard. On the fifth day from the start of the trial the judge
announced he was not feeling well enough to proceed with the trial and
ordered, against the objection of the accused's counsel, that the jury in
the case be finally discharged and the cause be continued for further trial
within one month. The defendant was remanded to jail, whereupon he filed
with the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri his
petition for discharge by the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he
was placed in jeopardy and the illegal discharge of the jury in the former
proceeding stood as an acquittal.' 8
169. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 468

(7th ed. 1903).

170. State v. Miller, 331 Mo. 675, 56 S.W.2d 92 (1932).
171. 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 869, p. 482 (3d ed. 1865); State v. Ulrich,
110 Mo. 350, 19 S.W. 656 (1892).
172. United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,651 (S.D.N.Y. 1868).
173. Ex parte Ulrich, 42 Fed. 587 (W.D. Mo. 1890). The federal court proceeded in this case as though it was granted the authority to act by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Such authority does not exist as was previously discussed.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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In deciding this case the federal court did not deny the discretionary
power of the trial court to discharge a jury on account of the illness of the
judge, juror, or the accused; in fact it affirmed that such discretionary
power existed. However, the court did state, and based its opinion on the
fact, that the defendant had been put in jeopardy by the commencement
of the case and that, by discontinuing the case and trying another case, the
accused was denied the speedy trial to which he was entitled under the
Constitution. Since the defendant was put in jeopardy and should have been
extracted by a determination of the jury that he was either guilty or not,
he was discharged.
Defendant was then re-indicted in the state court and the situation
was reconsidered by the Supreme Court of Missouri, which recognized that
the district court judge had gone behind the discretionary power of the
state trial court and had held that in this specific instance the dismissal of
the jury on the illness of the judge was an abuse of the discretionary power
of the court. As the court stated:
The question that at once arises, conceding that sickness of the
judge is a good cause for discharging the jury, who is to determine
this? The judge himself, or some bystander, or the attorneys for
the defendant, or some other court having no jurisdiction in the
case, or this court upon appeal? It seems to us that the question
at once suggests its proper answer. From the necessity of the case,
the trial judge must determine this himself.''
There are two reasons why the discretionary power of dismissal of
the jury by the court should not be retrospectively examined by other tribunals: 1) The discretionary power as a matter of course can lie nowhere
else, for "it is merely an incidental matter arising in the progress of the
trial, and in no way connected with the question before the jury, of guilty
or not guilty."" 2) If it were the rule that an actual necessity must exist
for discharge of the jury, then in the case of the sickness of a judge or the

174. State v. Ulrich, supra n. 173; United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 576, 22

U.S. 194 (1824). "The finding of a cause for withdrawing a juror or taking a case

from a jury is a judicial act; the authority to do it is entrusted by law to that
other court, and no other court can revise its decision . . . where a judicial act
is to be done upon proof laid before the tribunal and the act is done, it is to be
presumed that the necessary facts were proved and no other tribunal is at liberty
to re-examine the question."
175. United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,321 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
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juror, the defendant might object that the sickness was so slight or so
irrelevant as not to require absolutely that the trial be stopped.
As the illness of a judge is sufficient necessity for the discharge of
the jury and a retrial of the case, so also is the sickness"" or death of a
juror," a manifest necessity for the discharge of that jury and the
impaneling of another jury to try the case.
If physical disability or sickness renders a juror unable to continue
in the case and is deemed a sufficient necessity for the dismissal of the
jury, then obviously, the insanity of one of the jurors is also sufficient
cause for the dismissal of the jury.7 8 It would also seem that the fact
that the incapacity or an illness of the juror was brought about by his own
gross misconduct, such as excessive use of alcohol resulting in intoxication,
makes no difference so far as the interest of justice is concerned: his condition still would be a justifiable reason for the discharge of the jury."'
Any other result in the case of insanity or intoxication would give an insane or drunken juror the power to defeat entirely the ends of justice.
It appears to be a moot question whether the illness or death of a
member of the juror's family is sufficient justification for declaring a mis-

176. State v. Miller, 331 Mo. 675, 56 S.W.2d 92 (1932). Appellant was placed
on trial for murder, a jury was duly impaneled and sworn and a number of
witnesses were called to testify on behalf of the state. At this point of the trial
a member of the jury became ill and was given medical attention. On the following

day, the physician attending the sick juror was called to testify concerning the
condition of the juror, and stated that, in his opinion, the juror would be unable
to resume his duties in the case. Thereupon the trial court made the following
order: "On account of the illness of the juror in this case, it will be necessary
that a mistrial be had and another trial be had of this cause and the jury may
be discharged from further service in this case." The appellant excepted to the
court's ruling and entered a plea of former jeopardy. The Supreme Court of
Missouri denying the exception to the ruling stated: "If the rule were otherwise, the ends of public justice would often be defeated by some unforeseen
event beyond human control." Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166 (1829). "Another point
made by the prisoner's counsel is whether after a jury had been sworn, heard
the evidence and retired to consider their verdict, they can be discharged on
account of the sickness of one of the jurors. In this case the juror was sworn and
on his oath declared he was unable, by reason of sickness, to serve any longer
and then the whole were discharged. We are of the opinion that there is no
error on this point."
177. State v. Jeffors, 64 Mo. 376 (1847); Ex parte Ulrich, supra n. 173.
178. People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301, 1 Am. Dec. 168 (1801). "All the
authorities admit that when a juror becomes mentally disabled by sickness or
intoxication it is proper to discharge the jury." State v. Whitman, 93 Utah
557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 266 Pa. 245, 110 Atl. 85 (1920).
179. United States v. Haskell, supra n. 175; State v. Tyson, 138 N.C. 627, 50
S.E. 456 (1905).
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trial or discharging a jury in a criminal case." ' Although there are no
Mlissouri decisions on the point, it would seem that the discretionary power
in such a situation would lie in the judge to determine whether the serious
illness or death of a very close relative of a juror constitutes such a mental
strain on the juror as to incapacitate him intellectually from the proper
performance of his duties.1"'
Under Section 546.030, the accused in a criminal case must be in court
at all stages of the proceedings, and if this provision is not complied with,
and defendant is absent from any proceeding, then a mistrial results.'
Under this statute the court must discontinue the case upon the sickness
of the accused, and it cannot be reconvened until the accused is well enough
to proceed. But the question arises, and it has been contested, if the accused
must be present in court at all stages of the proceedings, but the accused
is so sick that the trial cannot be continued, will the discharge of the case
while the accused is not in court be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of
that case? The positing of the question answers itself, for the inherent
humanity and justice for which the law perpetually strives would require
that the prisoner, for the mere declaration of a mistrial, should not be
brought into court if he is so sick that his life would be endangered.'
As

180. Spelce v. State, 20 Ala. App. 412, 103 So. 694 (1924); Rittenberry v.
State, 30 Ga. App. 289, 117 S.E. 765 (1923); Salistean v. State, 215 N.W. 107

(1927). Sickness of juror's wife and death of his child warranted discharging the

jury and did not thereby effectuate an acquittal of the charges being tried against
the defendant. Contrast with Woodward v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 188, 56 S.W.
135 (1900); Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 624, 38 S.W. 206 (1896).
181. Spelce v. State, supra n. 180; Salistean v. State, supra n. 180.
182. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949): "No person indicted for a felony can be tried
unless he be personally present, during the trial; nor can any person be tried
or be allowed to enter a plea of guilty in any other case unless he be personally

present, or the court and prosecuting attorney shall consent to such trial or
plea in the absence of the defendant; and every person shall be admitted to make
any lawful proof by competent witnesses or other testimony in his defense; provided, that in all cases the verdict of the jury may be received by the court and
entered upon the records thereof in the absence of the defendant, when such
absence on his part is willful or voluntary, and when so received and entered
shall have the same force and effect as if received and entered in the presence
of such defendant; and provided further, that when the record in the appellate
court shows that the defendant was present at the commencement or any other
stage of the trial, it shall be presumed, in the absence of all evidence in the
records to the contrary, that he was present during the whole trial."
183. Cf. State v. McCrary, 287 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1956), where the defendant
inadvertently absented himself just before the jury reported and was discharged for failure to agree after two days' deliberation. The defendant waived
his right to be present and the discharge was not an acquittal.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

a practical consideration-what assistance to his counsel would a prisoner
be at such a time?
2. Misconduct of a Jury
The rule anciently prevailed at common law that after the jury retired
to deliberate on their decision, they might be discharged and a new jury
sworn to try the cause if the jury or any member of the jury separated.1"'
This strict precept has been amended by legislative enactments so as to
allow the jurors to separate in certain instances,"' but if the jury ever

184. In Hanscom's Case, 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 295 (1778), it was
stated by the court that if after the jury is sworn and has departed from the
court to deliberate and one of them willfully goes out of town whereby only
eleven remain, the eleven cannot give any verdict without the twelfth. The
twelfth, therefore, may be confined for his contempt of the court and the jury
may be discharged, a new jury sworn and new evidence given and a verdict
taken of the new jury without the defendant availing himself of the plea of prior
jeopardy.
185. People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301, 1 Am. Dec. 168 (1801), in which
Judge Kent states: "This power in the court (to discharge a jury under
certain contingencies), so far from impairing the goodness or safety of trial by
jury must add to its permanence in value. The doctrine of compelling a
jury to unanimity by the pains of hunger and fatigue, so that the verdict, in
fact, be founded not on temperate discussion and clear conviction but on strength
of body is a monstrous doctrine that does not as St. Germaine evidently hints,
stand with conscience, but is altogether repugnant to a sense of humanity and
justice. A verdict of acquittal or conviction obtained under such circumstances
can never receive the sanction of pubic opinion, and the practice of former
times, of sending the jury in cart from one assize to another, is properly con-

trolled by the improved manners and sentiments of the present day."
The ideas of Judge Kent find exemplification in the following statutes:
Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.230 (1949): "With the consent of the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant, the court may permit the jury to separate at any
adjournment or recess of the court during the trial in all cases of felony, except
in capital cases; and in misdemeanors the court may permit such separation of
the jury of its own motion, but when the juries are permitted to separate,

after being impaneled as provided for in this chapter, and at each adjournment
the court must admonish them that it is their duty not to converse among them-

selves, nor to suffer others to converse with them or in their hearing on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any opinion thereon until

the case is finally submitted to them."
Mo. R~v. STAT. § 546.240 (1949): "When the argument is concluded, the
jury may decide in court or retire for deliberation. They may retire under the
charge of an officer who, in case of a felony, shall be sworn to keep them together in some private or convenient room or place and not permit any person
to communicate with them, nor do so himself, unless by order of the court, or
to ask them whether they have agreed upon their verdict; and when they have
agreed, he shall return them into court, or when ordered by the court. The
officer shall not communicate to any person the state of their deliberations; provided, however, when there are women members of a jury, they may be kept
separate from the men members of the jury, if any, and under the charge of a
woman officer of the court during any time when the court is not in session, or
in which they are not deliberating upon their verdict."
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separates without leave of court after retiring to deliberate upon their
verdict, or has been guilty of any misconduct which tends to prevent a fair
and due consideration of the case, then this will not only be grounds for a
new trial but will entitle the court to discharge the jury and impanel a new
jury without allowing the accused to plead this as a bar to a subsequent
prosecution. 8
The reason that the misconduct or separation of a juror or the jury
vests the court with the power to discharge the jury without the defendant
being able to raise this matter on a plea of double jeopardy arises out of
the exigency of the situation itself.187 For to hold otherwise would place
it within the power of a single juror by misconducting himself, or by
absconding and separating himself from the rest of the jury, to create a
perfect protection to the accused against the legal consequences of his
crime."8
Misconduct, ipso facto, will not be sufficient to constitute a discharge
of the jury; the irregularity or misconduct must be such that a lawful
verdict is prevented from being produced in the case (as in the case of
intoxication where the juror must be so drugged that he cannot render an
intelligent verdict).
In all felony cases, except capital cases, the mere fact of the separation
of the jury without permission of the court before the case has been submitted to it will not furnish grounds for the discharge of the jury unless it
appears that they have been tampered with or have acted improperly.'
However, in all felony cases, "if after the case has been submitted to the
jury for its determination but before a verdict has been reached, there is an

186. Mo. RLv. STAT. § 547.020 (1949): "The court may grant a new trial
for the following causes, or any of them: . . . 2) When the jury has been
separated without leave of the court, after retiring to deliberate upon their verdict, or has been guilty of any misconduct tending to prevent a fair and due con-

sideration of the case;
27.26.

.

. ."; Supreme Court Rule 27.19; Supreme Court Rule

187. United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,321 (E.D. Pa. 1823). The
fact that a juror after the jury had left the courtroom went out of town con-

stituted a case of necessity such as would authorize the court to discharge the
jury. For further reasoning on this subject, vide, Mirachi, C-riminal Law--

Double Jeopardy--Juries-Separation,Discharge-Reconsideration of Verdict,
21 TEMP.L. Q. 391 (1948).

188. United States v.Haskell, supra n.186.
189. State v.Dougherty, 55 Mo. 69 (1874); State v. Matrassey, 47 Mo. 295

(1871); State v. Brennon, 45 Mo. 329 (1870).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

15

Missouri Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
22, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 2
MISSOURI
LAW

(Vol. 22,

opportunity that improper influence could be used on any juror, that alone
will require a new trial, even though it could be shown that improper influence was not exercised." 1 L0
The reason for the strictness of this rule against any misconduct or
separation of the jury which would allow improper influences to be placed
upon the jurors is to protect that all-important sanctity of an impartial
verdict. As Judge Kent stated:
A verdict obtained unfairly, by secret and artful, or bold and
direct influence over the jury by the parties, their friends, or bystanders, would, if admitted to be recorded, be a disgrace to the
administration of justice. The power of discharging a jury, in
these and other instances, which might be enumerated, is a very
salutary power, calculated to preserve that mode of trial in its
purity and vigor.""'
The misconduct of the officer of the court, without other proof of
tampering, will not constitute a sufficient necessity to dismiss or a dismissal of the jury.'92
The trial judge has an hiatus through which he must proceed, averting
the Scylla of allowing the case to proceed when a juror has been tampered
with, but avoiding the Charybdis of discharging the jury when the jury
may have been tampered with but such meddling has not affected their impartiality. In the latter instance there might be the danger of the accused
being allowed to plead such a discharge as a bar to a subsequent prosecution.
F. Failureof Jury to Agree Upon a Verdict
After the jury retires for the purpose of considering their verdict,
there are very few circumstances in which they might lawfully be discharged without effectuating a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the

190. State v. Dodson, 338 Mo. 846, 92 S.W.2d 614 (1936) (pertinent cases
cited therein).
191. People v. Olcott, supra n. 185; vide, Pemmer v. United States, 350 U.S.
377 (1956).
192. Vide, Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.020 (1949).
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same offense."' However, recognizing that the state has an equal right for
a unanimous verdict of conviction, just as the defendant has the same
right of unanimity for an acquittal, it is stated in the Missouri Constitution that "if the jury fail to render a verdict, the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury and commit or bail the prisoner for trial at the
same or next term of court.'"" ' Interpreting this section of the Missouri
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated, "Upon the first trial
of this case the jurors were unable to agree upon a verdict and for that
reason were discharged, but the 'hung jury' was not an 'acquittal' of the
defendant, did not entitle him to a discharge, and he was not thereby placed
in jeopardy within the meaning of the constitutional provision...'
The landmark case involving the discretionary power of a judge
to discharge a jury, which is unable to render a verdict, is United States
v. Perez,"' wherein the accused was put upon trial for a capital offense and
the jury, being unable to agree, was discharged by the court. This discharge
of the jury was without the consent either of the accused or of the prosecuting attorney. The Supreme Court of the United States declared:
We are of the opinion that the facts constitute no legal bar to a
future trial. The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted,
and may again be put upon his defense. We think that in all cases
of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the
authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
in their opinion, taking all of the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or where the ends of
public justice would have otherwise been defeated. They are to
exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to
define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest

193. State v. Jeffors, 64 Mo. 376 (1877) : ". . . an acquittal by them can only
be evidence by their verdict, and the record before us shows no such verdict and
only that they retired to consider their verdict. After a jury retires for this
purpose, there are three ways in which they might lawfully be discharged. 1)
By turning into the court a verdict for conviction or acquittal; (2) by being discharged by an order of court because of the inability to agree upon a verdict,
or by consent of defendant or by some unavoidable cause such as the sudden death
of a juror; and, 3) by the expiration of the term of court in which the trial is
pending."
194. Mo. CONST., Art. 1, § 19 (1945).
195. State v. Berry, 298 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Mo. 1957).
196. 9 Wheat. 576, 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
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caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and
obvious causes, and, in capital cases, especially, courts should be
extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of
life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right
to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for
the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judge
under oaths of office.
The sound discretion referred to in this decision is that discretion of the
trial court which is involved in the determination of when, and after how
long a deliberation, the jury should be discharged for inability to agree
upon a verdict.""7 In weighing the proper exercise of this power, the court
must consider that the accused is entitled to have the jury given a reasonable time in which to agree upon a verdict before a mistrial should be declared and the jury discharged."'8
This discretionary power of the court to discharge. 9 has been held
not to be abused by discharging the jury for inability to agree after three
days, ° less than two days,"°' one day,2 seventeen hours,2° ' and even
0

02

197. State v. Matrassey, 47 Mo. 295 (1871) ; State v. Scott, 45 Mo. 302 (1870).
198. CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 469 (7th ed. 1903).

199. State v. Matrassey, supra n. 197. "The court has the undoubted authority

in its discretion to discharge the jury when it becomes satisfied that they would

be unable to agree on a verdict."
200. State v. Dunn, 80 Mo. 681 (1883). Defendant was indicted for murder in
the second degree, pleaded not guilty and the cause was tried before a duly impaneled and sworn jury, which after retiring for one day returned to the court
and being unable to agree were discharged without objection from the defendant.

At the next term, the defendant was reindicted on charge of murder in the first
degree for the same killing. After the defendant's special plea of former

acquittal was denied, the cause was retried before a new jury. After three days'
deliberation the jury returned and informed the court that it was unable to
reach a verdict, whereupon the jury was discharged over the objections of the
defendant. The defendant was thereupon tried before a third jury and found
guilty of murder in the second degree. "In this case the jury had not been out
three days and are not prepared to say that the prisoner's objection alone should
outweigh all other circumstances of public justice or control the honest discretion
of the court in deciding, as it seems to have done, that the jury in point of fact
were unable to agree upon a verdict, and, if so, its powers and duty to discharge
the jury cannot be questioned and such discharge of the jury so ordered consti-

tuted no bar to another criminal trial."

201. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). The jury retired and considered their verdict for four hours after which time they returned to the court
and informed the court that they were unable to agree. The Supreme Court
stated: "The plea of former jeopardy was rightly held bad. . . . upon those
facts where the discharge of the jury was manifestly necessary in order to pre-
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after deliberating less than four hours. °'
The Supreme Court of the United States has indirectly held that the
discretionary power of the trial court to discharge a jury which is unable
to agree is a final determination of that factor and no succeeeding court
can go behind the discharge and determine that the discretionary power
was abused."°
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in considering this issue, stated:
We must take for granted, in the absence of all of the records
and opposition thereto, that the discretion which the Constitution
manifestly confers was not unsoundly exercised by the court.0 0

vent a defeat in the ends of public justice was a question to be finally decided by the
presiding judge in the sound exercise of his discretion."
Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909). Defendant was tried and convicted
of murder but the judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Montana.
Upon a second trial, the jury retired for deliberation on July 12 and on July
14 they returned into court and stated that they were unable to agree, whereupon the court discharged the jury from further consideration of the cause.
On the third trial the defendant interposed the plea of once in jeopardy on the
grounds that the jury was improperly discharged at the end of the second trial.
Upon the authority of the cases previously cited, the Supreme Court held that
the discharge of the jury in this situation was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution and "the record shows that the jury were kept out at least 24 hours and
probably more and trial court found that there was a reasonable probability
that the jury could not agree." State v. McCrary, 287 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1956).
The jury was out approximately two days and failed to bring in a verdict.
202. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902). The jury retired at four o'clock
in the afternoon to consider their verdict and returned at 9:30 the succeeding
morning, declaring to the court that they were unable to agree upon a verdict,

whereupon the court discharged them. The defendant maintains that this
amounted to an acquittal. The court followed and cited United States v. Perez,
9 Wheat. 576, 22 U.S. 194 (1824), and held that dismissal of the jury in this
situation was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense; State
v. Dunn, supra n. 200.
203. State v. Copeland, 65 Mo. 497 (1877). The jury retired on the fourteenth
day of the month to consider their verdict and on the fifteenth day of the same
month again came into court and stated that they could not agree and were thereafter discharged. The court denied that this constituted a bar to subsequent
prosecution.
204. In Ev parte Ruthven, 17 Mo. 541 (1853), the accused was indicted for
murder and the trial continued for twelve days, after which the cause was
committed to the jury who retired to consider their verdict. After an absence of
a few hours, the jury returned to court and announced that they could not agree.
The judge directed the jury to retire for half an hour or an hour and he would
consider whether they should be discharged. It was at the expiration of this
fixed period that they came into the courtroom and were discharged by the court
without the consent of the prisoner or his counsel.
205. United States v. Perez, supra n. 202.
206. State v. Copeland, supra n. 203.
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Therefore, the ability of the trial court to discharge a jury cannot be
questioned either as to whether the jury was out long enough or whether the
jury was hopelessly deadlocked. These are matters which can only be
determined by the trial court, although notwithstanding the fact that the
inherent discretion of the court to discharge the jury when they failed to
enter a verdict is a sound legal discretion which should not be retrospectively
questioned by an appellate court, it has been suggested that whenever it
appears that the discretion has been arbitrarily or unsoundly exercised,
such discharge in legal contemplation operates as an acquittal within the
meaning of the Constitution. ' The reviewing court should no more be
allowed to determine whether the trial court was warranted in discharging
the jury for failure to bring in a verdict and whether the jury had been out
a reasonable time, than to determine whether the judge, juror, or the accused
was sick enough to warrant discharging the jury.
If the power of the trial judge to discharge a jury when unable to
agree is to be properly administered, it can only be administered by the
trial judge whose decision should be final, for he is the only one who can
properly discern at first hand the attitude of the jury and their inability
to reach a verdict. The trial court, however, should exercise this power
with the greatest caution, as the citizen with his life or liberty given into
the hands of a jury is entitled to a fair consideration by them, and the
accused should not be deprived thereof by the arbitrary action of the
court in dismissing the jury."'
Undoubtedly, if the defendant consents to the jury being discharged,
then he cannot complain at a later time that the court abused its discretion. " However, even if the defendant does object to the order discharging
the jury, that:

207. State v. Dunn, supra n. 200.
208. In regard to the reviewing power of a higher court, it would seem that
an appellate court could only determine whether the jury was discharged for
the reason that they were deadlocked and could not agree. If they were discharged for that reason the appellate court must sustain the discretionary act
of the trial court and cannot look any further behind the decision.

20D. State v. Scott, 45 Mo. 302 (1870). "I know of no law which prohibits the

court from again putting the prisoner on trial at the same term, when the first
trial has not resulted in a verdict. The record does not show that he suffered any

injustice by the proceeding. He acquiesced in it at the time and we see no reason
-to interfere on that account." MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 186, p. 539 (1934).
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. . . objection could not have the effect to divest a court of
its conceded discretion to judge and determine whether the report
of the jury so made to the court was true or not. It may be conceded that the request of the prisoner that the jury might be allowed or even required to further consider if their verdict ought
not to be disregarded by the court in determining the question. Yet,
without more it is in the sound discretion of the court to order their
discharge if in view of all of the facts and circumstances it is
satisfied that the jury are unable to agree after a reasonable time
and opportunity has been afforded and they so report under oath."'0
In view of this, the consent or non-consent of the defendant is immaterial
so long as the trial court is satisfied that an agreement upon the verdict
cannot be reached by the jury.
G. Effect of Maniifest Necessity
As we have seen, the jeopardy, from which the constitutional provision
protects the defendant from being twice subjected, commences when the
jury is sworn and is charged with the trial of the cause. Jeopardy, as such,
becomes dependent upon the presumption that the tribunal will continue
legally organized, with the accused being charged, to the end of the trial,
and in the end, pronounce a valid judgment-either for or against the
accused. Any incidence or happening in the case over which the court has
no control, but which conclusively rebuts this presumption of finality of
judgment, of necessity must also rebut the conclusion or presumption of
the jeopardy of the prisoner by reason of the commencement of the trial.
Manifest necessity to discharge the jury exists where the circumstance
which caused the court to enter such a discharge was a circumstance which
was not and could not be controlled by any of the parties in the case, either
the accused, the prosecution, or the court itself. Instances of this are failure
to arraign the defendant; the sickness of the judge, juror, or the accused;
the misconduct and separation of the jury; the end of the term of court,
and the bias or prejudice of a juror. When the jury is discharged for any
of these reasons, the accused may be retried, and the plea of former jeopardy
is not available to him.

210. State v. Dunn, 80 Mo. 681, 688 (1883).
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However, when the jury is discharged under circumstances which are
within the control of the prosecutor or the court, then said discharge is
not considered to be the result of manifest necessity on the part of the
court to protect the ends of justice. Such instances are the discharge of the
jury for inability of the state to produce witnesses or a discharge at the
mere whim of the court. Whenever a discharge falls outside the orbit of
"manifest necessity" then the accused may effectively plead twice being
put in jeopardy as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
VIII. AcQuirAL
In the case of State v. Casey, 1' the defendant was indicted and tried
for larceny and embezzlement. Under the instructions of the court, the
jury found the defendant not guilty of embezzlement but guilty of larceny.
The defendant's appeal was sustained on grounds that the conviction of
larceny was promised on insufficient facts. The accused was ordered discharged since he could not be charged again with embezzlement, even
though the facts warranted such an indictment under the evidence presented.2 1
To analyze this case, we will have to reconsider the Missouri Bill of
Rights, namely, "nor shall any person be put again in jeopardy of life
or liberty for the same offense after being acquitted by a jury. "212 The
accused, Casey, is protected not only by this constitutional provision but
also by the provisions of section 556.260:
When a defendant shall have been acquitted upon a trial, on
the merits and facts, and not on any grounds stated in section
556.250, he may plead such acquittal in bar to any subsequent
accusation for the same offense, notwithstanding any defect in
form or substance in the indictment upon which such acquittal
was had.21'
The constitutional provision coupled with this legislative enactment clothed

211. 207 Mo. 1, 105 S.W. 645 (1907).
212. This situation is to be differentiated from the case where the defendant
is not charged with two crimes but is charged with only one crime and a verdict
is brought in by the jury for a crime of which the defendant was not charged
in the indictment.
213. MO. CONST., art. 1, § 19 (1945).
214. Mo. REv.STAT. (1949).
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the accused with an immunity from further prosecution for the same offense
after once being acquitted of that offense. 1 '
A. Same Offense
The prohibition against a person being twice placed in jeopardy means
not only that one may not be tried twice for the identical act or crime,
"but that the State cannot split up a single crime and prosecute it in
parts or piecemeal." 1 ' Expressed in other words, "a prosecution for any
part of a single crime bars further prosecution based upon the whole or
any part of the same offense. " 17
Before a defendant may enter a plea of former jeopardy on the grounds
that he has been acquitted or convicted of that charge, defendant must show
that the former acquittal or conviction was for the same offense as charged
in the second indictment. 18' That there must be an identity of offenses for
the defendant to plead twice being put in jeopardy was recognized as a
settled principle of Anglo-Saxon law at the time of Blackstone."1 '
The determinative test as to whether the offense charged in the second
indictment is the same offense of which the defendant was previously
prosecuted was set forth by Chitty as follows:
In order, however, to entitle the defendant to this plea, it is
necessary, that the crime charged be precisely the same, and that
the former indictment as well as the acquittal was sufficient. As
to the first of these requisites, the identity of the offense, if the
crimes charged in the former and present prosecution are so distinct, that evidence of the one will not support the other, it is inconsistent with reason, as it is repugnant to the rules of law to say,
that the offenses are so far the same, that an acquittal of the one
will be a bar to the prosecution for the other. But on the other
hand it is clear, that if the charge be in truth the same, though the
indictments differ in immaterial circumstances, the defendant may

215. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); Hewitt v. United States,
110 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U.S. 641 (1940); United States v.
Brimsdon, 23 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Mo. 1938); State v. Toombs, 326 Mo. 981, 34

S.W.2d
216.
217.
218.
219.

61 (1931).
State v. Brooks, 298 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Mo. App. 1957).
Ibid.
State v. Stephens, 70 Mo. App. 554 (1897).
4 BLAcXsTONE, CoMMENTARIEs 335.
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plead his previous acquittal with proper averments; for it would be
absurd to suppose that by varying the day, parish, or any other
allegation, the precise accuracy of which is not material, the prosecutor could change the rights of the defendant, and subject him to a
second trial."'
In Missouri, the term, "same offense" "does not signify the same
offense eo nomine, but the same criminal act, transaction, or omission.)""
If the evidence which is necessary to and is submitted in the second prosecution would have supported a conviction under the first prosecution, then
the offenses are deemed to be identical and the subsequent prosecution is
barred."' A plea of former jeopardi will be properly overruled if the
offense charged in the second indictment requires proof of facts different
from those necessary for a conviction under the first indictment."'
1. Prosecution for Commission of a Crime Within a Certain Period
Unless time is not of the essence of an offense,"' an acquittal or conviction of a crime does not constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense, if the latter offense is alleged to have been committed at a
designated time, different from the date of the commission of the prior
offense."' A subsequent offense, identical in its elements to a prior offense
but separate and distinct as to both time and place of commission, is not
barred by a verdict rendered on the prior offense."'

220. CHITTr, CRImINAL LAW §§ 452-3, p. 368 (1819).

221. State v. Toombs, 326 Mo. 981, 34 S.W.2d 61 (1931). See Note, 15 Mo. L.
RBv.185 (1950).
222. Manning v. United States, 275 Fed. 29 (8th Cir. 1921); United States
v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mo. 1941); State v. Hicklin, 358 Mo. 1016,
218 S.W.2d 564 (1949); State v. Toombs, 362 Mo. 981, 34 S.W.2d 61 (1931);
State v. Headrick, 179 Mo. 300, 78 S.W. 630 (1904), vide, State v. Salter, 256
S.W. 1070 (1923).
223. State v. Hayes, 296 Mo. 58, 246 S.W. 948 (1922); State v. Toombs, 362
Mo. 981, 34 S.W.2d 61 (1931); vide, Kling, Former Jeopardy, 15 Mo. L. REv. 185
(1950).
224. United States v. One Buick Coach Automobile, 34 F.2d 318 (N.D. Ind.
1929).
225. State v. Matkins, 37 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1931); State v. Florigan, 355 Mo.
1169, 200 S.W.2d 64 (1947). Both cases involve the separate prosecutions for
embezzling at different times; State v. Hussey, 145 Mo. App. 671, 123 S.W. 485
(1909). Defendant was prosecuted for two separate assaults on a policeman and
not placed in jeopardy twice since the assaults, although committed on the same
day, were committed at different times and places; City of St. Joseph v. Dienger,
165 Mo. 95, 65 S.W. 223 (1901); State v. Stephens, 70 Mo. App. 554 (1897);
State v. Maupin, 71 Mo. App. 54 (1897).
226. State v. Matkins, supra n. 225; State v. Florigan, supra n. 225; State v.
Hussey, supra n. 225; State v. Burgess, 268 Mo. 407, 188 S.W. 135 (1916).
Embezzling at two different times from same person.
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A prosecution for a continuing offense is a bar to any subsequent
indictment for the same offense which was committed before the institution of the first prosecution."" This anterior prosecution does not constitute
a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the continuance of the offense after
the date of the termination of the first prosecution in that a new offense
is begun and is triable as such." '8
2. One Crime an Element of Another
When a defendant is indicted for a greater degree of a crime and a conviction under such indictment may be obtained for a lower degree thereof,
then the acquittal or conviction of the defendant on the greater degree of the
crime bars a further prosecution on the lower degree of the crime, as well
as any other offense for which the defendant could legally have been convicted under the first indictment."'
An acquittal or conviction for a lesser degree of the offense charged
in the indictment bars a prosecution for the higher degree of the offense,
if defendant under the indictment could legally have been convicted of the
lesser degree.28 So, under an indictment for robbery in the first degree, a
conviction of robbery in the second degree operates as a bar to the subsequent prosecution for robbery in the first degree."'
3. Several Offenses Involved in the Same Transaction
The Supreme Court of Missouri has steadfastedly refused to recognize
what is known as the "same transaction rule."2 "2 Instead the court has
preferred to follow the "separate or several offense doctrine" which means
"that an offender is not to be exonerated from responsibility for his acts
because his desires or passions persuade him or impel him to commit
two or more offenses during a transaction or occasion. 2 3

227. State v. Lawson, 239 Mo. 591, 145 S.W. 92 (1912) (continuing offense of
gambling); Miller v. Gerk, 27 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. 1930)
failure to support a child).

(continuing offense of

228. Miller v. Gerk, supra n. 227.
229. State v. Hamlin, 171 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1943); Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 556.240
(1949).
230. State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63 (1874); State v. Pitts, 57 Mo. 85 (1874).
231. State v. Brannon, supra n. 230; State v. Pitts, supra n. 230. This is
subject to the qualification that the judgment is not reversed on appeal.
232. State v. Brooks, 258 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. App. 1957).

233. State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199, 33 S.W.2d 905 (1931).
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Therefore, if during the execution of a criminal transaction more than
one separate and distinct criminal offense is committed, an indictment and
prosecution on one of these offenses will not impede a later prosecution
on the other offense."' A single act may violate two statutes, and if each
offense requires proof of additional facts, an acquittal or conviction under
either does not exempt the accused from prosecution under the other.2"
The offenses of larceny and obtaining money under false pretenses
contain essentially different elements, hence an acquittal under an information for larceny is no bar to a subsequent prosecution, based on the
same facts, for obtaining money under false pretenses.2 " An acquittal of a
charge of murder which was alleged to have transpired at the time of an
attempted arson does not bar a prosecution for arson."" The conviction of
defendant of murder did not preclude a prosecution on robbery growing
out of the same transaction. 3 8
The determination of whether one offense contains an essential element
of another offense primarily involves criminal law, not constitutional law.
Hence for our consideration, these general rules, combined with the
examples presented, are adequately illustrative of the necessity that the
second presecution be for the "same offense."
4. Offenses Against Different Sovereignties
If both the state and federal governments have jurisdiction over the
same crime, both sovereignties have the right to punish the criminal for
the same offense. 3 ' Unless this right is abrogated by statute, an acquittal
or conviction in the court of one sovereignty is not a bar to a prosecution
by the other." '

234. Thomas v. United States, 156 Fed. 897 (8th Cir. 1908); O'Malley v.

United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942); State v. Hess, 240 Mo. 147, 144
S.W. 489 (1912); State v. Foley, 247 Mo. 607, 153 S.W. 1010 (1913); State v.
Clark, 220 Mo. App. 1308, 289 S.W. 963 (1927).
235. Gray v. United States, 14 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1926).
236. State v. Anderson, 186 Mo. 25, 84 S.W. 946 (1905).
237. State v. Babbitt, 228 Mo. 252, 128 S.W. 953 (1910).
238. State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199, 33 S.W.2d 905 (1931).
239. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Ex parte January, 295 Mo.
673, 246 S.W. 241 (1922) ; State v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91 (1949).

240. Herbert v. Louisiana, supra n. 239; Ex parte January, supra n. 239;
State v. Graves, supra n. 239.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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The prosecution and conviction under a city ordinance is not a bar to
a prosecution for the same transaction under state laws since the prosecu'1
tion under the city ordinance is a mere civil proceeding.
B. In Various Courts
Whenever the defendant is acquitted of a criminal charge before a
justice of the peace or a magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case and
the ability to impose sentence, the defendant, having been put in jeopardy,
is barred from being tried for that offense again."' The effect of this
acquittal, whether it be direct or indirect, is that it bars any subsequent
indictment or information being filed against the accused for the same
crime, but another crime which forms an element or some portion of that
crime is not barred if the justice of the peace or magistrate court has no
jurisdiction of that specific offense or degree thereof."4 '
As an acquittal before a justice of the peace or in the magistrate's
court is a bar to the subsequent finding of an indictment or information
in any other court in the state, so also is an acquittal on an indictment in
the circuit court a bar to subsequent criminal procedure before a justice
of the peace; that is, if the defendant was indicted and acquitted for the
same felony as described in the justice of the peace court.24"
An acquittal on an indictment in the circuit court does not bar a
subsequent prosecution before a justice of the peace for any minor offense
which the defendant could not have been tried on in the circuit court for
lack of jurisdiction." ' This is premised on the rule that, if the defendant
was not or could not have been tried for the minor offense under the indictment, then he was not put in jeopardy for that offense and he can be
subsequently prosecuted in the court of a justice of the peace for the minor
offense."4 ' Under this rule an acquittal on an indictment for a felonious

241. State v. Jackson, 220 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. 1949); State v. Muir, 164 Mo. 610,
65 S.W. 285 (1901).
242. State v. Polk, 144 Mo. App. 326, 127 S.W. 933 (1910). The information
contained three counts with the jury finding the defendant guilty on only the first
count. On the defendant's appeal a trial "de novo" was held. The court ruled
that the defendant, having been put in jeopardy and an acquittal, even though

indirect, having been rendered in the justice's court, no further suit in any other
court in the state could be maintained.
243. State v. Gustin, 152 Mo. 108, 53 S.W. 421 (1899).
244. Vide, State v. Wichtman, 26 Mo. 515 (1858).
245. Ibid.
246. Ibid.
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assault will not bar a prosecution for a common assault and battery before
a justice of the peace, because the defendant under the prior indictment
could not be convicted for, nor put in jeopardy on, the minor offense. 4"
C. In the Absence of a Jury
The wording of the Iffissouri constitutional provision, namely, "after
being acquitted by a jury," ' becomes of great importance in determining
whether an acquittal by a jury is one of the necessary elements in former
jeopardy. We cannot consider this provision alone, however, but we must
take into consideration section 556.260 of the statutes which provides that,
"When a defendant shall have been acquitted upon a trial upon the merits
and fact, . . . he may plead such an acquittal in bar to any subsequent
accusation for the same offense. "2'"
This section of the Missouri statutes extends the common law and constitutional immunity of twice being in jeopardy to those persons who have
been acquitted upon a trial and that would include a trial before the court,
sitting without benefit of a jury. Although there are no Missouri decisions
to that effect, it would seem that following the above stated statutory provision, a direction of an acquittal by a court would bar a subsequent prosecution on the same charge in any other court in the state."' This acquittal
would extend only to those crimes upon which a direction of acquittal was
specifically given, and any crimes or offenses which were discharged by the
court, or any charges which were discharged before the defendant was put
in jeopardy, would not serve as a plea of former acquittal on another
trial.251
D. Defective Indictment
At common law an acquittal upon an indictment would not support a
plea of autrefois acquit, if the indictment was so defective that had it been

247. Ibid.
248. M o. CONsT. art. 1, § 19 (1945).
249. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
250. Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931) (a directed verdict);

Supreme Court Rule 26.10.

251. State v. Speer, 6 Mo. 644 (1840). "The verdict of acquittal is a complete
protection to the defendant against any further proceedings"; State v. Wisebeek,
139 Mo. 214, 40 S.W. 946 (1897).
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objected to at the trial, either by motion in arrest of judgment or by writ
of error, it would not have supported any conviction or sentence. - " The
basis for this doctrine is Vaux's Case, wherein it is stated:
Because the indictment in this case was insufficient, for this
reason he was not legitimo modo aquitatus,nor was the life of the
party in the judgment of the law ever in jeopardy. '
This, however, is not the rule in Aissouri, for it is specifically set out by
the statute that the defendant "may plead such acquittal in bar to any
subsequent accusation for the same offense, notwithstanding any defect
in form or substance in the indictment upon which acquittal was had." ' '
The rationale of holding that an acquittal, even though founded on a faulty
or defective indictment, is still a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same charge is found in the concept that the state should not be benefited
by its own mistakes. The deprivation of the benefit of an acquittal by a
jury on the suggestion that the indictment was incorrectly drafted would
be permitting the state to take advantage of its own wrongs.
This legislaive enactment is designed to prevent the defendant from
being twice put in jeopardy, not from twice being punished, and the
accused, whether the indictment is faulty or not, is equally put in jeopardy
in the first trial. The prosecutor, if he be dissatisfied with the verdict in
the first trial, should not be allowed to come before the court in a later
proceeding and state that he had no venue or that his own indictment was
deficient in other particulars and that, therefore, he should be granted
another opportunity to convict the defendant." ' This principle was recognized and sustained by an early decision of the United States Supreme
2 58

Court.

252. 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 248, 394 (1778); 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE

CROWN § 8 (1795).
253. 4 COKE 44. The only defect in the original indictment in Vaux's Case was
that the defendant, being indicted for the murder of one Ridley, the indictment
was insufficient to the extent that it did not expressly allege that Ridley drank
the poison. The indictment merely stated that he took and drank, and it omitted
the Words, "said poison."
254. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.260 (1949).
255. 1 Johns. Cas. 66 (1806). Justice Livingston, in a dissenting opinion, gives
a very thorough and complete summary of -whythe defendant should not be tried
again, even though the indictment in the prior suit was faulty; vide, Commonwealth v. Purchase, 2 Pick. 521 (1824).
256. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). A general verdict of acquittal
upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment undertaking to charge murder not
objected to before the verdict as insufficient in that respect is a bar to a second
indictment for the same killing.
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The effect of this statute is to remove such procedural defects as lack
of venue as cause for granting a new trial. If the court, however, lacked
jurisdiction in the first instance, then an acquittal does not bar a subsequent prosecution, for the defendant actually was not in jeopardy.
E. Verdict Rendered on Sunday
In some jurisdictions, a verdict rendered on Sunday is null and void,
and therefore a verdict of acquittal entered on Sunday would not be a bar
to a subsequent prosecution on that verdict in those states. However, this
is not consistent with the effect of a verdict for a verdict and discharge of
a jury is merely a ministerial act involving no judicial discretion." ' Recognizing the proper function of the verdict, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a verdict may lawfully be received on Sunday, and,
as such, be a bar to any further prosecution for the same offense."'
F. Variance
Where there exists a material variance between the charges set forth
in the indictment and the proof adduced in the case, the defendant is
entitled to an acquittal on the particular indictment.2 " Such an acquittal
does not constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution and the accused may
be tried and convicted on a subsequent indictment for the same offense or
If the
any degree thereof or of an attempt to commit such an offense.'
proof
the
and
variance between the allegation contained in the indictment
presented at the trial is immaterial, then such a variance should be disregarded, and if defendant is in fact acquitted because of such a variance,
then this acquittal will be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense."'

257. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 277.

258. Ball v. United States, supra n. 256; Zacharias, Effect of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus on Double Jeopardy, 14 CHI.-KENT L. Rnv. 156 (1936).
259. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 556.250 (1949). "When a defendant shall have been

acquitted of a criminal charge upon trial, on the ground of variance between the
indictment and the proof, or upon any exceptions to the form of substance of the
indictment, or where he shall be convicted, but the judgment shall for any cause
be arrested, he may be tried and convicted on a subsequent indictment for the
same offense, or any degree thereof, or of an attempt to commit such an offense.
260. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 556.250 (1949).
261. State v. Goff, 66 Mo. App. 491 (1896). The court held that the mere
variance in the day of the crime is not a sufficient variance to prevent a judgment from acting as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense; vide,
Supreme Court Rule 26.04; Sawer, Autrefois Acquit and Decision Not "On the
Merits," 2 REs JUDiCATA 203 (1941).
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A. EnablingDefendant to Testify for the State
It is specifically provided by statute in Missouri that when two or
more persons are jointly indicted the court may, at any time before the
defendants have gone into their defense, direct a defendant to be discharged
so that he may be a witness for the state."'2 Any time before the evidence is
closed, a defendant against whom there does not exist sufficient evidence
to put him on his defense, may be discharged for the purpose of giving
testimony for his co-defendant."' In both these instances, "the order of
discharge shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense." 2 6..
In Missouri, therefore, the discharge of a co-defendant either for the
purpose of using him as a state's witness or for the purpose of giving his
testimony for a co-defendant is tantamount to an acquittal on the merits
and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 6
B. 'UnderHabeas Corpus Proceedings
A discharge of the defendant on a writ of habeas corpus is not such a
discharge as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, since
a discharge under such a writ is a discharge from custody, not from the
penalty imposed under the prior proceeding.2 ' Even though the defendant
has served part of his sentence under the previous conviction, his discharge under a writ of habeas corpus and subsequent resenteneing does
not constitute putting defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense."'
However, if the accused has suffered the full punishment prescribed
in a sentence rendered in the prior case, and the prosecution attempts

262. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.280 (1949).

263. Ibid.
264. Ibid.
265. Supreme Court Rule 26.07.

266. State v. Schierhoff, 103 Mo. 47, 15 S.W. 151 (1891).
267. State v. Schierhoff, supra n. 266. Defendant was found

guilty of a felonious
wounding and was fined $100.00. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial but
before it was disposed of, final judgment was rendered against him on the verdict.
The court ruled that defendant was not placed in jeopardy even though he was
imprisoned on execution issued thereon for failure to pay the fine. He was subsequently released on a writ of habeas corpus, due to the fact that the original
judgment, sentencing him to prison was erroneous and illegal. The defendant
may again be imprisoned under a sentence entered in the subsequent prosecution;
Ex paarte Jilz, 64 Mo. 205 (1876).
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to re-try and re-sentence the accused on this count, this action is a derogation of an accused's right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense.268
C. Failureof the State to Bring A Cause Within a CertainTerm of Court
Recalling the utterance of Homer that "on the first day of his servitude
the captive is deprived of one-half of his manly virtue,""' the courts have
recognized that each hour an accused is illegally restrained "is not only
a degradation in its tendency, but is a crime against liberty.'".. In view of
this concept, the sole object and purpose of all criminal laws from first to
last becomes one of insuring a speedy trial to the accused and thus guarding
against a protracted imprisonment or harassment by a criminal prosecu-

tion.
In Missouri the accused's right to a speedy prosecution is set forth in
the Constitution, namely: "That in criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to . . . speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county..... A mere declaration, however, that the accused is entitled to
a speedy trial is not an adequate protection to the accused unless sufficient
sanction is to be imposed upon the state for failure to bring the accused to
trial within a certain time. The means, sanctions or penalties which are
employed for stimulating prosecutors and officers of the law to diligence in

268. Bayless v. United States, 147 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1945). The appellant was
accused and pleaded guilty to stealing a motor vehicle and was sentenced to five

years in prison, to run consecutively with a twenty year sentence imposed in
another case against him. At the end of five years a writ of habeas corpus

was granted appellant. It was found that the initial trial was void, so the
government reindicted him for stealing a motor vehicle and the appellant was
found guilty. The court stated: "The attempt of the government to subject

the appellant upon this indictment for the identical offense for which he had
suffered the full punishment prescribed in the sentence rendered thereon was

contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and constituted double
jeopardy, forbidden by the amendment, and that he was entitled to be discharged
before the proceedings under this indictment. . . . The five year sentence on its
face had ceased to afford grounds for detaining him in prison, and upon that fact
appearing, the judge in the habeas corpus proceedings would have no occasion
to inquire into the validity of the sentence. Whether valid or invalid, it had served

the purpose of a valid sentence and had caused the maximum imprisonment for

the crime to be served, and all questions as to whether it ought to have been
rendered or not were entirely moot." The Court of Appeals stated further that

this was the first time in the history that a defendant had paid the full penalty
for his crme and the government tried to re-prosecute because the indictment
under which he had served the full penalty was faulty.
269. Cited in Ex parte Ulrich, 42 Fed. 587 (W.D. Mo. 1890).

270. Ibid.
271. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (a) (1947).
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the prosecution was brought to the front by the legislature when it declared
that the consequence of a failure to indict or to try the accused within a
certain period operated as a discharge from the pending offense. 2
In Missouri there are four legislative enactments protecting the accused
in various situations from the failure of the state to prosecute within a
certain length of time. Section 545.890 protects the defendant and gives him
a discharge for the offenses stipulated in the indictment, if, having been
committed to prison, he shall not be brought to trial before the end of the
second term of court of the court having jurisdiction of the offense.2"
Section 545.900 states that if the defendant is indicted for an offense and
is placed on bail, and is not brought to trial before the end of the term of
the court in which the cause is pending, then he shall be discharged from
that offense.2 7' Section 545.910 sets forth the reasons for which a cause
may be continued to the next term and if the accused is not brought to
trial before the end of that term, then the state shall not be entitled to any
further continuance of the case and the prisoner shall be discharged.2 "
Section 545.920 sets forth the various times at which the defendant shall

272. State v. Wear, 145 Mo. 162, 46 S.W. 1099 (1898). "That the legislature

has the power to pass statutes of limitations which bar either civil or criminal
prosecution no one has ever doubted. At the end of the designated period, whether
the prosecution be civil or criminal, the bar of the statute attaches and that bar
is a perpetual bar."
273. Mo. REV. STAT. (1949). "If any person indicted for any offense, and

committed to prison, shall not be brought to trial before the end of the second

term of the court having jurisdiction of the offense which shall be held after such
indictment found, he shall be entitled to be discharged, so far as relates to the

offense for which he was committed, unless the delay shall happen on the appli-

cation of the prisoner, or shall be occasioned by the want of time to try the cause
at such second term."
274. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1949). "If any person indicted for any offense, and held
to answer on bail, shall not be brought to trial before the end of the third term
of the court in which the cause is pending which shall be held after such indictment found, he shall be entitled to be discharged so far as relates to such offense
unless the delay happened on his application, or be occasioned by the want of
time to try such cause at such third term."
275. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1949). "If when application is made for the discharge
of a defendant under either Section 545.890 or 545.900 the court shall be satisfied there is material evidence on the part of the state which cannot then be had,
that reasonable exertions have been made to procure the same and that there is
just ground to believe that such evidence can be had in the succeeding term, the
cause may be continued to the next term, and the prisoner remanded or admitted
to bail, as the cause may require. If the defendant shall not be tried before the
end of the term last mentioned, the state shall not be entitled to any further continuance of the case, and the prisoner shall, if he requires it, be discharged."
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be entitled to discharge.""
The ramifications surrounding these statutes are so multifarious that
it would not be beneficial to go into them thoroughly. We are paramountly
concerned with the effect of these statutes. It is true that at common law,
in the absence of special statutes of limitations, the mere failure to find an
indictment or to proceed with the case after indictment was brought would
not operate as a discharge of the accused from the offense."' Also, in some
states, the statutes provide that the discharge shall be from imprisonment
or bail, and without other language it has been held in these states, that
this does not operate as a limitation to the bringing of a subsequent indictment on that case." 8 However, in lissouri the statutes specifically provide
that the failure to prosecute shall discharge the accused so far as relating
to the offense or from the crime."' A failure to prosecute, therefore, in
Missouri works a final discharge from the offense.
When the requisite time has elapsed and no showing has been made by
the state for further delay, the defendant is entitled as a matter of right to
a judgment of discharge so far as relates to such offense."' Such a discharge
is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal with judgment thereon."'
. . . it makes no difference that the defendant was never in
fact put in jeopardy of life or limb, under the first indictment
within the meaning of Article 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as the order discharging him under
section 4223 (supra) was and is an absolute acquittal of the offense

276. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949). "In all cities or counties in this state in which
there shall be more than two regular terms of the court having jurisdiction of
criminal cases, the defendant shall not be entitled to be discharged for the reasons
and under the circumstances mentioned in Section 545.890 until the end of the
third term after the indictment was found and under the circumstances mentioned
in Section 545.900 the defendant shall not be entitled to be discharged until the
end of the fourth term after the indictment was found and in either case the
matter of discharge shall, at the end of such third and fourth terms, be governed
by the provisions of Section 545.910."
277. At common law, under the statutes of limitation, the failure to bring
the indictments within a certain period of time did not work a discharge. United
States v. Cadaar, 197 U.S. 475 (1905).
278. State v. Jenkins, 19 Wash.2d 181, 142 P.2d 263 (1943).
279. State v. Wear, 145 Mo. 162, 46 S.W. 1099 (1898).

"If the defendant be

out on bail and be not brought to trial before the end of the third term of the
court in which the cause is pending, he is 'entitled to be discharged so far as
relating to such offense.'"
280. State v. Wear, supra n.279.
281. Ibid.
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and a complete bar to any other further prosecution against him
for the same offense. " 2
Although the aforementioned enactments providing for a speedy
trial "are criminal statutes and should be strictly construed in the interest
of liberty of the citizens," 8 ' the protection of said statutes, being enacted
for the benefit of the accused, may be waived by him."8' These statutes
provide that a defendant who was not tried after three terms of court may
be tried if "the delay . . .be occasioned by the want of time to try such
cause at such third term." 8. If the court is satisfied that there is material
evidence on behalf of the state which cannot then be had and reasonable
attempts to procure the same have been exerted, and there is just cause
to believe that such evidence can be obtained by the next succeeding term,
the cause may be remanded to the next term. ' These exceptions arise out
of the exigency of the situation itself and as such do not hinder but in fact
further public justice. 8"
In all other instances except those enumerated above, if the cause proceeds beyond the third term without the accused being brought to trial,

282. State v. Wear, supra. n. 279 at p. 287. After the accused was indicted and
held to answer on bail, he was not brought to trial before the third term of the
court in which the cause was pending. Said delay did not happen on behalf of
any application by defendant but at the instance and application of the state
even though there was not a want of time on the part of the court to try the
cause. The charges against the appellant were discharged. Thereafter the defendant was indicted again on the same charge and convicted of second degree
murder. On appeal, the court held that the discharge acted as a final judgment
against the accused and he could not be retried for the crime for which he was
discharged. "No case can be found in the books where a person discharged because of the failure of the state to bring him to trial within a given time has ever
been put on his trial for the offense from which he was discharged. .. ."
283. State ex rel. Stephens v. Wurdeman, 295 Mo. 566, 246 S.W. 189 (1922).
284. State v. Hicks, 353 Mo. 950, 185 S.W.2d 650 (1945) ; State v. Nelson, 279
S.W. 401 (1925); State v. Pierson, 343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149 (1938).
285. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 545.890 and 545.900.
286. Id. at § 545.910.
287. State v. Wear, 145 Mo. 162, 46 S.W. 1099 (1898). "This is the inflexible
rule fixed by the law itself, when there are no delays occasioned by the defendant
or want of time by the court to try the case and the fact that the time during
which the defendant is out on bail may be extended beyond those terms, by reason
of continuances on his part or on that of the court for want of time to try the
case, does not do away with the statute being a statute of limitations, for such
extensions of time are incident to all statutes of limitations. For although the
time prescribed by the statute cannot be diminished, yet its running may be
retarded in consequence of various circumstances occurring which the state mentions as hindering causes."

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

35

Missouri
Law Review,
Vol. 22,
Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 2
MISSOURI
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 22

the accused is automatically. 8 entitled to a discharge which acts as an
acquittal of the offense charged in the indictment"" and bars a subsequent

prosecution for the same offense.
X.

CovMrcTIoN

The provision of the Missouri Constitution, "nor shall any person be
put again in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense after being
once acquitted by a jury,""' does not strictly apply where the defendant
was not acquitted, but was convicted, on the first trial. There are two
reasons why a person who is convicted of an offense cannot be retried for
that offense: 1) the common law rule that no person shall for the same offense
be twice put in jeopardy is in force in this state, and, as such, precludes a
second conviction and punishment for the same offense;"' 2) Section
556.240 prohibits a person who has been convicted on an indictment from
being tried again for the same offense."'
After being once convicted, a defendant cannot:
. . . thereafter be tried or convicted of a different degree of
the same offense, nor for any attempt to commit the offense charged
288. State v. Wear, supra n. 287. Defendant does not have to demand a trial
before he will be entitled to a discharge.
289. State v. Bithorn, 278 S.W. 685 (1925). Such statutes, although referring
to discharge within a stated time after indictment, have been held to apply also
to prosecutions by information.

290. Art. 1, § 19 (1945).
291. State v. Toombs, 326 Mo. 981, 34 S.W.2d 61 (1930) ; State v. Linton, 283
Mo. 1, 222 S.W. 847 (1920); State v. Bockman, 344 Mo. 80, 124 S.W.2d 1205
(1939). "We, therefore, hold appellant sufficiently invoked the protection of the
rights under that maxim of the common law, approved by varying federal and
state constitutional and statutory provisions that no man shall be twice put in
jeopardy of life and limb or convicted for the same offense. There seems to have
risen some confusion on the question of former jeopardy and our own reports are
not entirely free from criticism along this line. After carefully reviewing many
of the cases upon the subject we are led to the belief that this confusion arises
by reason of failing to call to mind the law of former jeopardy first arose
under the common law, and that in some State Constitutions, and the Federal
Constitution, the old common law rule that no person shall for the same offense be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb is incorporated in its entirety. While in other
State Constitutions, notably that of Missouri, apparently only a portion of the
common law on the subject was incorporated and thereby removed from legislative
interference. But it goes without saying that the common law as to former
jeopardy is in effect in this state, unless the same has been changed or modified
by the Constitution or by statutory enactment. The fact that the portion of
the common law on this subject was written into our Constitution should certainly
not be given the effect of having repealed the remaining portion of common law
on the subject unless the constitutional provision should be found to be in conflict therewith."
292. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
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in the indictment, or any degree thereof, or any offense necessarily
included therein, provided he could have been legally convicted
of such degree or offense, or attempt to commit the same, under the
first indictment."'
It is a principle too well established in American jurisprudence to call
for extensive elaboration that one convicted in a court of competent
jurisdiction and punished cannot thereafter be subject to a second punishment for the same offense.
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England
or America it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the
same offense.
Also:
The Common Law not only prohibited the second punishment
for the same offense but it went further and forbid a second trial
for the same offense whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, or whether in the former trial he had been acquitted
or convicted."9 '
No distinction is made in Missouri as to the effect of an acquittal or
conviction on an indictment in regard to the plea of former jeopardy.
A prior conviction, like a prior acquittal, can be pleaded as a bar to a,
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.'
A. Court of Competent Jurisdiction
A plea of former conviction to an indictment will not be sustained
unless the prior conviction was had in a court which had jurisdiction of
the case. 9 ' A conviction, for instance in a justice of the peace court, would
not be a bar to a subsequent indictment in another court if jurisdiction
were expressly denied the justice of the peace.'

293. Mo. RLv. STAT. § 556.240 (1949).
294. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (U.S.) 163 (1873); vide, United States v.
Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603 (1880); State ez rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
(1947).

295. State v. Toombs, supra n. 291.
296. State v. Payne, 4 Mo. 376 (1836).
297. State v. Payne, supra n. 296. Defendant was indicted for conspiring with
others to unlawfully beat and assault another and was found guilty before the
Justice of the Peace in St. Louis. Thereafter, the defendant was brought before

the circuit court and pleaded the former conviction before the justice of the peace
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If for any reason it can be said that the accused has not been accorded
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, then the defense of prior jeopardy will
not protect the defendant from a new trial, for in holding that the previous
trial was a nullity the court also must hold that the defendant had not
been in jeopardy under the charge." 8 The accused, therefore, not having
been put in jeopardy by a void judgment of conviction, upon his discharge thereunder, may again be arrested and prosecuted.'""
B. Followed by a Judgment
It has been held that a former conviction cannot be pleaded as a bar
unless it has been followed by a judgment; the theory being that the
whole proceeding is considered a nullity."' This, however, does not appear
to be the ruling of the common law, nor does it appear to follow the rationale
of the plea of autrefois convict. As Blaekstone says:
The plea of autrefois convict or of former conviction for the
same identical crime, though no judgment was ever given or perhaps will be, (being suspended by benefit of clergy or other
causes) is a good plea in bar to an indictment. And this depends
upon the same principle as the former (that is autrefois acquit),
that no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one
and the same crime."'O
Although no cases have been cited on the point in Missouri, since Missouri
has adopted the common law and the common law forbids a second trial
even though no judgment has been entered in the previous trial, there could
be no second trial of the case."'
If the sentence had been entered, but not served, then a new sentence
could be imposed.'
This is based on the premise that, "if at the time of

court. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied the plea, stating that the laws of
Missouri "giving the Justice of the Peace jurisdiction expressly except from
the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace all cases of riots. This case is thereby not triable before a Justice of the Peace." This jurisdiction to try riot cases
belonging to the circuit court, the plea of the defendant is without merit.
298. Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1942); Bryant v. United

States,
299.
300.
301.

214 Fed. 51 (8th Cir. 1914).
Mitchell v. Youell, supran. 298; Bryant v. United States, supra n. 298.
Pond v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 232, 48 S.W.2d 285 (1932).
4 BLACKSTONE, COaMENTARmEs 336.

302. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883).

303. Armenta v. United States, 48 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1931).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2

38

1957]

Miller: Miller: Plea of Double Jeopardy in Missouri
THE PLEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN MISSOURI

283

the re-sentence, the defendant had not begun the service of his original
sentence, then there is no question of jeopardy or double punishment... "' Also, the erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single
offense of which he has pleaded guilty does not constitute double jeopardy.05
The proper remedy for the party is to apply for vacation of the sentence and
a resentence in conformity to the statute under which he was adjudged
guilty.',
C.Defective Indictment or Information
A Missouri Statute specifically provides that an accused may plead
an acquittal as a bar to a subsequent prosecution even though that acquittal
was had on an indictment which was defective in form or substance. 07
This statute has been deemed inapplicable to instances where there was a
conviction on a defective indictment or information on the previous trial.0"
Since the provisions of the statute are delimited in favor of an acquittal,
a conviction under a faulty indictment or information not putting a
defendant in jeopardy, does not constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense on a valid indictment."°"
D. Same Offense
The plea of autrefois acquit and the evidence which is adduced must
show that the offense of which the defendant was convicted is the same
offense as that charged in the subsequent indictment. 0 In this regard the
same rules which apply to acquittal also apply to conviction.

304. Ibid.
305. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941).

306. Ibid.
307. Mo. RLv. STAT. § 556.260 (1949).

308. State v. Keating, 223 Mo. 86, 122 S.W. 699 (1909); State v. Hall, 141
Mo. App. 701, 125 S.W. 229 (1910). Defendant was indicted on four counts
charging violation of the option laws. The trial was held before a jury resulting

in a conviction on the first count and an acquittal on the other three counts.
Defendant appealed to the St. Louis Gourt of Appeals which held the indictment
insufficient and discharged the defendant, whereupon the prosecuting attorney
filed information on the same charges in the next term of court. The court held

that the defendant may be tried on the count on which he was convicted, but not

on the three counts on which he was acquitted, since this statute does not apply
where there is a conviction, but only where there is an acquittal on the merits

and the facts.
309. State v. Keating, supra n. 308; State v. Manning, 168 Mo. 418, 68 S.W.
341 (1902); State v. Hall, supran. 308.
310. State v. Wister, 60 Mo. 592 (1876); State v. Vollenweider, 94 Mo. App.

158, 67 S.W. 942 (1902).
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XI. WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE

The privilege of immunity from twice being put in jeopardy which is
granted by the Missouri Constitution is a privilege which is personal to
the accused alone, and being a privilege may be waived by him.l' The
instances wherein, and the means whereby, an accused may waive his right
to plead twice being put in jeopardy are multitudinous and to list each
one at this time would merely be repetitious. The instances wherein a waiver
occurs fall under the general rule that whenever the accused, by an affirmative act on his part, procures a prior judgment to be set aside or sets in
motion the machinery for a judgment to be set aside, then by this affirmative act the accused has waived his right to plead this former judgment
as a bar to a subsequent prosecution. '
When a subsequent prosecution is commenced as to an offense for which
the accused has already been put in jeopardy, the plea of former jeopardy
is waived by failure of the accused to allege it as a defense, or if alleged as
a defense, the failure of the accused to enter evidence and to do other affirmative actions consonant with pleading it as a defense. However, in the
second prosecution if the information is drawn up in such a manner that
the accused is unable to ascertain that this is the same prosecution for which
he was formerly tried and placed in jeopardy, these facts negate any
presumption or inference of waiver of the plea by the accused and hence
the entrance of the plea of former jeopardy at the close of the trial would
be a timely entrance. '
A. Arrest of Judgment
The Missouri Constitution provides, ". . . and if judgment be
arrested after a verdict of guilty on a defective indictment or information
. . . the prisoner may be tried anew on a proper indictment or information or according to the law.'" 1' It is provided by statute that when the
defendant has been acquitted or convicted, ". . . but the judgment shall
for any cause be arrested, he may be tried and convicted on a subsequent

311. State v. Harper, 353 Mo. 821, 184
330 Mo. 652, 52 S.W.2d 181 (1932); State
552 (1939).
312. State v. Austin, 318 Mo. 859, 300
92 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1936).
313. State v. Bockman, 124 S.W.2d 1205
314. M o. CONsT., art. 1, § 19 (1945).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss3/2
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indictment for the same offense, . . . ""' It is a settled principle of law
in Missouri that under these constitutional and statutory provisions, any
defendant in a criminal case who procures a verdict or judgment against
him to be set aside. 1 may be prosecuted again for the same offense of which
he was previously convicted."'
If a valid verdict which has been entered by a jury duly impaneled
and sworn (and all the other prerequisites of jeopardy having been duly
met) is set aside by the court sua sponte, said act is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense unless the accused voluntarily acquiesces
and consents to the action of the court."'
The United States Courts also recognize the right of an accused in a
criminal case to have a verdict and judgment against him set aside. There
is concomitant with this right of the accused, the right of the prosecution
to procure a new indictment for the offense which has just been set aside..'.
'When the indictment or information in the criminal prosecution is so
defective or insufficient to charge the offense intended to be charged and the

315. Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.250 (1949).
316. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 547.040 (1949); Supreme Court Rule 27.21. Motion in
arrest of judgment is abolished.
317. State v. Stroemple, 355 Mo. 1147, 199 S.W.2d 913 (1947). Defendants
were sentenced on pleas of guilty to informations charging armed robbery of
a bank. Petition for writ of habeas corpus was sustained because of failure of
trial court to appoint counsel. Defendants alleged that since they had been once
tried for the same offense of armed robbery, that this was a bar to all subsequent
prosecutions for the same offense. The court stated: "In these circumstances the
appellants' prior convictions upon their plea of guilty to the informations having
been set aside as void, they could not validly support the pleas in bar that they
had theretofore been placed in jeopardy for the same offense." Cert. denied.
Skiba v. State of Missouri, 331 U.S. 851 (1864).
318. State v. Snyder, 98 Mo. 555, 12 S.W. 369 (1889). The jury brought in
the verdict which the court set aside sua sponte. The Supreme Court of Missouri
held, "Therefore, the proceedings of the second trial being against law cannot
be permitted to stand. The jurors were the sole judges of the heinousness of the
offenses, and of the punishment to be meted out therefor; and so long as they
assessed a punishment within the bonds prescribed by the statute, their verdict
was beyond the control of any earthly power, so far as concerns setting aside
and granting a new trial, in opposition to the will of the defendant. And such
opposition will be presumed, where the record, as here, recited that the verdict
was set aside by the court 'on its own motion.'" Ex parte Snyder, 29 Mo. App.
256 (1883). The court recognized the fact that verdicts may be set aside and
new trials may be awarded on the application of the defendant. "But whence
comes the power of the trial judge, of his own motion, to vacate a verdict which
he has received? Even by unnecessarily discharging the jury there is high
authority for saying the act was tantamount to an acquittal."
319. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
(U.S.) 163 (1873); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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defendant initiates a motion in arrest of judgment on the grounds of said defect or insufficiency on the sustentation of his motion by the court, the accused is not only estopped to deny that the information or indictment was
defective or insufficient, but the accused becomes amenable to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense."'
B. Appeal
1. A Pending Appeal
The mere pendency of an appeal does not deprive the defendant of the
right to assert the judgment being appealed as a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, until such time as the prior judgment
shall be reversed by the appellate court." 1 This is based on the rationale
that even though there may be pending a motion to appeal, the judgment
entered in the case is still a conclusive judgment which will bar further
prosecution, for "when one has taken his appeal from the judgment
against him, whether for murder or for debt, he cannot be deprived of the
rights to which the records show he is entitled.'.' The right to use this
judgment as a bar cannot be wrested from the accused by any power.
A judgment of an appellate court does not become the decision of the
court upon which a final judgment can be entered and thus sustain a plea
of former jeopardy until final disposition of the pending motion for rehearing."'
2. Judgment Reversed on Appeal
Where the accused on his own motion procures an appeal and thereafter the first conviction is reversed and remanded, the accused becomes
320. State v. Owen, 78 Mo. 367 (1883). Defendant was indicted on two counts:
first, for larceny and the second, for embezzlement. Upon trial, the defendant

was found guilty of the first count and not guilty to the second. However, due to
a fatal defect in the first count the judgment was arrested and upon a subsequent
acquit which was overruled by the court.
State v. Broeder, 90 Mo. App. 156 (1901). "When an attempt by information
has been made to charge the defendant of a crime, and he is before the court to
answer the charge intended to be made against him, it would be a perversion of
both the spirit and intent of the code of criminal procedure to discharge him
before a valid information could be filed against him by the prosecuting officer
for the reason the first information was insufficient to charge the offense intended to be charged." Pratt v. United States, 102 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
321. State v. Bockman, 124 S.W.2d 1205 (Mo. 1939); State v. Biesemeyer,
136 Mo. App. 668, 118 S.W. 1197 (1909).
322. State v. Biesemeyer, supra n. 321.
323. State v. White, 363 Mo. 83, 248 S.W.2d 841 (1952).
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estopped to plead the prior conviction as a defense to a subsequent prosecution, since the reversal of the first conviction and the remanding of the cause
put it in the same position as if no proceedings had been had in the case
against the accused."'
This rule is non-applicable to co-defendants when one defendant is
acquitted of the charges and the second defendant is convicted. The reversal of the judgment of conviction of the latter defendant in no way affects
the former defendant from pleading his acquittal as a bar to a subsequent
prosecution.2
C. Proouring a New Trial
Although the Missouri Constitution specifically provides that no person
shall "be put again in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, after
being once acquitted by a jury, ' whenever an accused person, convicted
of a crime, procures a verdict against him to be set aside and a new trial
granted on his motion, said affirmative acts are deemed to be a waiver of
his constitutional protection against twice being put in jeopardy.'"" The
accused thereby becomes estopped to plead the former conviction as a
bar to another trial for the same offense.
This postulate also applies if the court grants a new trial on its own
motion while the motion by the defendant for a grant of new trial is
pending, and the defendant acquiesces in a new trial being granted. '
But if the court of its own motion sets aside the verdict and orders a new

324. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); State v. White, supra n. 323; State
v. Rozell, 279 S.W. 705 (Mo. 1926); State v. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S.W. 697
(1901).
325. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
326. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (1945).
327. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U S. 155 (1900); Hopt v.
Utah, 114 U.S. 488 (1885) ; Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) ; State v.
Herring, 92 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1936); State v. Beard, 334 Mo. 909, 68 S.W.2d 698
(1934) ; State v. Austin, 318 Mo. 859, 300 S.W. 1083 (1927) ; State v. Patterson,
88 Mo. 88 (1885); State v. Bruffey, 11 Mo. App. 79 (1881).
328. State v. Harper, 353 Mo. 821, 184 S.W.2d 601 (1945). The accused requested additional time in which to file a motion for a new trial and this was
granted by the court Thereafter the court, in the accused's presence and of
its own motion, granted a new trial and the accused acquiesced as to this motion
and applied for leave and was granted the right to file a new recognizance and
thereafter participated in a second trial without interposing the plea of former

jeopardy.
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trial and the defendant objects thereto, the defendant in the subsequent
trial is thereby placed in jeopardy for the second time."'
D. A Verdict Which Acquits in Part and Convicts in Part
If an indictment or information containing several counts charges the
accused with the commission of several separate and distinct offenses and
thereafter the accused is acquitted as to some of these counts and convicted
under others, the sustention by the court of his motion for a new trial does
not constitute a waiver for the offenses charged in the counts on which he
was acquitted, but the accused may be subject to a subsequent prosecution
for the offenses contained in the counts on which he was convicted."' This
principle is predicated on the idea that the defendant in his application for
a reversal of the conviction seeks a reversal only as to that portion of the
verdict which supports his conviction and seeks to retain not only those
parts which sustain the acquittal, but the acquittal itself." 1
In view of Section 556.260... which allows the defendant to plead an
acquittal upon the merits as a bar to a subsequent prosecution even though
there have been defects in the form or substance of the indictment, a motion
by the defendant to have the verdict set aside on the grounds of a faulty
indictment is applicable only on those counts of the indictment on which
the defendant was convicted."' On those counts on which the defendant

329. State v. Snyder, 98 Mo. 555, 12 S.W. 369 (1889); ER parte Snyder, 29
Mo. App. 256 (1888). Defendant was found guilty by a jury and a penalty
was assessed thereon. The setting aside of such verdict as the penalty prescribed
by the jury on the motion of the court itself was in contravention of the Missouri
Bill of Rights and a violation of the clause that no person can be twice put in
jeopardy of life or liberty.
330. State v. Hall, 141 Mo. App. 701, 125 S.W. 229 (1910).

331. Ibid.
332. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1949).
333. State v. Hall, supra n. 330. Defendant was convicted on one count for

violation of the local option law and acquitted on three other counts. The court
held the defendant could not be tried again for the offenses alleged on the three
counts on which he was acquitted, even though the court held on appeal that the
indictment was insufficient and discharged the defendant thereon. But the defendant could be reindicted and prosecuted for that count in the indictment for
which he had been convicted.
State v. Kattlemann, 45 Mo. 105 (1864). Defendant was indicted on five
counts for forgery and was tried on the whole indictment and found guilty on
only the first count. The verdict was set aside and a new trial awarded de-

fendant who was thereupon tried on the whole indictment at the second trial
and found guilty on the first count and also on the third. The Supreme Court of
Missouri stated: "This was an error. The verdict on the first trial was an
acquittal on all but the first count and he should have been tried again upon that
alone."
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was acquitted, the acquittal would stand as a permanent bar to any subsequent prosecution thereon."'
1. Contradictory Verdicts
If two indictments or counts of an indictment charge the defendant
with commission of the same offense, and a verdict of guilty is brought in
on one count and not guilty on the other count, it is the law of Missouri
that such a verdict is so patently contradictory that it cannot be considered a verdict either of conviction or acquittal."' A reversal and remanding of the case for a new trial does not constitute putting the defendant
in jeopardy a second time."'
The law formerly in Mlissouri was that when the offense charged in
two counts of an indictment was the same, an acquittal of the defendant on
the first count amounted to a bar to his conviction on the second count even
though at the same time the jury had entered a verdict of guilty on the
second count." '
2. Separate Offenses in the Same Counts
Where a statute permits a prosecution for two distinct, but separate
and dependent offenses, such as burglary and larceny, in the same count
or separate counts of the same indictment and the defendant is indicted
for both burglary and larceny in one count and is convicted of the larceny
but acquitted as to the burglary, the defendant's motion for a new trial

334. State v. Hall, supra n. 330; State v. Kattlemann, supra n. 333.
335. State v. Akers, 278 Mo. 368, 213 S.W. 424 (1919). Each count of the

information charged the appellant with the commission of the identical crime.

The verdict found the defendant guilty on the first count and not guilty under
the second count. "The verdict is entirely inconsistent because the jury could
not have legally found what the verdict says they did find. Appellant was either
guilty or not guilty of the crime and could not have been both as found by the
jury. We therefore think the verdict is too contradictory to support a judgment
of conviction. . . . It is true that Article 2, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution provides that the prisoner shall not again for the same offense be put in
jeopardy 'after being once acquitted by a jury' but that constitutional provision
undoubtedly has in contemplation a legal verdict of acquittal. The verdict held
in review in the Headrick case and likewise the verdict in the case at bar, as has
been pointed out above are too contradictory to be considered a verdict either of
conviction or acquittal."
336. State v. Akers, supra n. 335.
337. State v. Headrick, 179 Mo. 300, 78 S.W. 630 (1904), overruled by State v.
Akers, supra n. 335.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

45

Missouri Law Review,
22, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 2
MISSOURI
LAWVol.REVIEW

[Vol. 22

is not a waiver of his constitutional rights as to the acquittal."8 The
acquittal in such a situation operates as a bar to a subsequent prosecution
as to the burglary but the defendant may be re-tried on the offense of which
be stood convicted, larceny."'
3. Withdrawal of a Count of an Indictment
Whenever several counts of an indictment are pending against the
accused, the withdrawal of one of those counts from the consideration of
the jury is an acquittal of the count withdrawn and forever bars a subsequent prosecution on that count.' ° That withdrawal cannot be pleaded as a
bar to the remaining counts of the indictment which were not withdrawn
41
from the consideration of the jury."
4. A Verdict Silent as to Part of the Offenses Charged
If several indictments or counts in an indictment charge the defendant
with the commission of separate and distinct offenses, and the jury brings
in a verdict of guilty on one indictment or on one count of the indictment
and is silent as to the remainder, the inadvertence of the jury is not reversible error. ' Furthermore, the law treats such silence as an acquittal to
all other indictments or counts as to which the jury remained silent.' 3 On
a new trial being granted, defendant can be re-tried only on those indict-

338. State v. Bruffey, 11 Mo. App. 79 (1881). "If there had been two indictments, one for each of the crimes charged, and two separate trials, it will hardly
be questioned that the granting of a new trial in one case would not reopen a verdict of acquittal in the other. Such an acquittal would be a perpetual bar under
Article II, section 23 of our state constitution; . . . We are unable to see how

the General Assembly can, by a statute regulating criminal procedure, deprive any
citizen of a constitutional right. No such effect was intended and none can
follow from a law which simply provides for the trial of two offenses charged
under one indictment. The prosecution for burglary in this case was ended forever by the verdict of not guilty."
339. State v. Bruffey, supra n. 338.
340. State v. Hess, 144 S.W. 489, 240 Mo. 147 (1912). Defendant was indicted
on two counts of arson. The first count was withdrawn from the consideration
of the jury and the court determined that this in no way affected the other count
pending before the jury, but was merely an acquittal on the count pending therein,
and as such had the same effect as any other acquittal on subsequent prosecutions
being held on that offense.
341. Ibid.

342. State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 600 (1883) ; State v. Cofer, 68 Mo. 120 (1878).
343. State v. Hayes, supra n. 342; State v. McCue, 39 Mo. 112 (1866); State
v. Gannon, 11 Mo. APP. 502 (1882); State v. Cofer, supra n. 342; State v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 510, 22 S.W. 696 (1893); State v. Polk, 144 Mo. App. 326, 127 S.W.
933 (1910).
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ments or counts of the indictment on which he was convicted in the prior
prosecution." As to those offenses on which the jury was silent, he may
plead those as a bar to a subsequent prosecution, just as if the jury had
brought in a direct acquittal on those charges. '
The procurement or the acquiescence of the defendant in having the
first verdict set aside is not to be construed as a waiver of the legal advantage
of an acquittal which inured to him from the failure of the jury to make a
34
direct finding on the pending indictment and counts of the indictment.
By agreeing that the verdict which was rendered against him might be set
aside, the defendant's agreement thereto cannot be construed as an agreement that an implied verdict of not guilty which was rendered in his favor
on the silent counts should also be set aside, for his position in such a case
would be no different than if a direct verdict of acquittal had been brought
in by the jury.'
This general rule is applicable even though the indictments charge
two different offenses involving the same transaction, such as rape and an
attempt to commit a rape upon the same person."' If the jury brings in a
verdict on one count and is silent as to the other, this amounts to an acquittal
of the count on which the jury was silent.'

344. State v. Cannon, supra n. 343; State v. Polk, supra n. 343.
345. Ibid.
346. State v. Cannon, supra n. 343. "The consent of the prisoner in this case
to have the first verdict set aside, is not to be construed, we think, as an agreement on his part to waive any legal advantage from the failure of the jury to
make a finding on the second count. He agreed that the verdict which was
rendered against him might be set aside. He did not thereby agree that the

implied verdict of not guilty, which had been rendered in his favor on the second
count, should also be set aside. His position is certainly not worse than if he had
applied for and obtained a new trial, in which case, under the ruling of the
case of the State v. Bruffey, he could not again be put upon trial under the
second count."
State v. Polk, supra. "When the defendant had been convicted on trial of
only one of the three counts, on appeal, he could not again be tried on the counts
on which he had been acquitted. His appeal on the count on which he was convicted, did not appeal the counts on which he had been acquitted."
347. State v. Gannon, supra n. 343; State v. Polk, supra n. 343.
348. Stateyv. Cofer, supra n. 342.
349. State v. Cofer, supra n. 342. The defendant was indicted on two counts,
one for committing and the other for attempting to commit a rape. The accused
was tried on both counts and convicted on the count of committing rape. "If
found guilty of committing the rape he could not have been found guilty of
attempting the commission of the same rape," and therefore the silence of the
jury on the count of committing the rape acted as an acquittal on that count and
the defendant cannot be retried on that count.
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However, if different indictments or counts of an indictment are simply
formal variations, stating the same offense, and the jury returns a verdict
of guilty as to one count but is silent as to the remaining counts, the silence
of the verdict in such a case does not constitute an implied acquittal on such
counts as to entitle the accused, if a new trial is granted, to be discharged
as having been once acquitted." 0
Any other view would, to our mind, lead to an absurdity. It
would amount to saying that the mere inference of an acquittal
arising from the silence of the verdict as to certain counts is strong
enough to overcome a verdict of guilty finding expressly to the contrary under a count charging the identical crime."'
As Shylock was frustrated in his attainment of a pound of flesh by the incongruity of not being able to take with the flesh one drop of blood, so also
is the accused in the above situation frustrated in his attempt to have an
implied acquittal overrule a direct conviction.
E. A Verdict Convicting of a Lower Degree of Crime Than Charged
As was discussed previously, an acquittal.. or a conviction.' on an indictment for a greater degree of an offense is a bar to a subsequent indictment for a lesser degree of an offense included in the former, wherever
under the indictment for the greater offense the defendant could have been
convicted of the lesser. The converse of this is not true, however, where
there is a conviction of a lower degree of a crime than charged and a new
trial is granted by motion or on appeal."'
In a prosecution for a felonious assault with attempt to ravish, if
defendant is convicted of a common assault and thereafter a new trial is
granted, the cause stands as though there had been no trial and defendant
may be re-tried for the felonious assault charged in the original information."' The law decrees that there was no acquittal of the greater charge "
350. State v. Reeves, 276 Mo. 339, 208 S.W. 87 (1918).
351. State v. Reeves, supra n. 350. "The silence of the first verdict to counts

two and three did not warrant an entrance of acquittal or amount to an acquittal
thereunder."
352. State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63 (1874).
353. State v. Ball, 28 Mo. 327 (1858).

354. Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910); Irono v. United States, 199
U.S. 521 (1905); State v. Higgins, 252 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1952); WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 396, p. 559 (12th ed. 1932).
355. State v. Higgins, supra n. 354.
356. Ibid.
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and hence no deprivation of any right accorded the defendant by Sections
556.240 and 556.260.'3
Before Article II, Section 23 of the Constitution of 1875 was materially
changed'. to add the words:
. . . and if judgment be arrested after a verdict of guilty,
or a defective indictment, or if judgment on a verdict of guilty be
arrested for error in law, nothing herein contained shall prevent a
new trial of the prisoner on a proper indictment, or according to
correct principles of law.
it was the law of Mlissouri that a person who was indicted and tried on a
greater offense and convicted on a lesser offense could not on a second trial
be prosecuted for the greater offense if the prior judgment was reversed
for error in law or set aside on a motion of the defendant himself.'"'
The ratiocination of these earlier decisions is that if a verdict of guilty
of a lesser offense is entered, then of necessity it must be inextricably
implied from the finding of guilty of the lesser offense that the defendant
is not guilty of the greater offense.6 0 These decisions, however, fail to con-

357. Mo. Rsv. STAT. (1949).
S58. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883). "There is no question of the
right of the State of Missouri, either by a fundamental law or by an ordinary
act of the legislature, to abolish this rule, that it is a valid law as to all offenses
committed after its enactment."
359. State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63 (1874). Although acquitted of the charge of
grand robbery in the first degree the indictment also embraced the charge of
grand larceny. The court stated: "But I submit, that the major includes the
minor; that when one is charged with the crime of murder in the first degree,
and is tried and acquitted by a jury, he cannot be again tried upon the same or
another indictment for an inferior degree of homicide; and the same rule holds
in a case of robbery in the first degree. If a new indictment were found against
this defendant, for the same supposed offense, he could plead his acquittal in bar,
and coud not be again tried on the same indictment."; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32
(1859); State v. Smith, 53 Mo. 139 (1873); State v. Ball, 28 Mo. 327 (1858).
These latter cases involve the defendant being charged with murder in the first
degree and convicted of murder in the second degree. The court held that such a
conviction barred the accused from being prosecuted again for first degree murder
although he coud be tried for second degree murder.
360. State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32, 46 (1859). "Of what avail, then, is the constitutional protection, which is thus controlled by a technical notion of the
entirety of a verdict, and leaves the accused the alternative of either asking relief
from a violation of law only on condition of being tried a second time for an
offense of which he has been declared by a jury of the country guiltless, or of
submitting to the consequences of the error, whatever they may be, without
regress. If he has the error corrected, he waives his claim to the rights which
the law of the land promises him. If he has the error, for which he has been
wrongfully convicted, corrected, he is only undoing what has been done in violation
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sider that when the affirmative decision of guilty which furnishes the sole
basis for the negative implication of not guilty is eliminated by the voluntary
action of the accused seeking a new trial, then the negative implication
should not be allowed to stand. This was clearly set forth in Irono v. United
States, where the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
. . . it seems much more rational and in better accord with
the proper administration of the criminal law to hold that, by appealing, the accused waives a right to thereafter plead once in
jeopardy, when he has obtained a reversal of the judgment, even
as to that part which acquitted him of the higher while convicting
him of the lower offense. When, at his own request, he has obtained
a new trial, he must take the burden with the benefit, and go back
for a new trial on the whole case. It does not appear to us to be a
practice founded on solid reason to permit such a limited waiver
by an accused party while himself asking for a reversal of the judgment.801
After being convicted of the lower degree of crime when charged with
a higher offense, the accused by requesting a new trial waives any plea
of former jeopardy which may have inured to him and consequently may
be tried on the higher offense. '
This question as to the effect of a verdict which convicts of a lower
degree of crime than charged arises mainly in cases of homicide. When the
defendant is put to trial on this second indictment for murder in the
first degree after he has been once tried and convicted of murder in the
second degree,"6 ' or convicted of manslaughter..' for the same offense, said

of his rights and the law of the land. He is thus necessarily once in jeopardy

and convicted by reason of errors against which he protested, and in remedying

which he must be subjected to a second trial. But not only so, the second trial,
to which he is thus necessitated, if had at all, can only be obtained by submitting
to a trial not only on the charge in which he was erroneously convicted, but also

upon an offense upon which he was found not guilty."
361. Irono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).

362. State v. Beard, 334 Mo. 909, 68 S.W.2d 698 (1934); State v. Austin, 318
Mo. 859, 300 S.W. 1083 (1927).
363. State v. Stallings, 334 Mo. 1, 64 S.W.2d 643 (1933); State v. Beard,
supra n. 362; State v. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S.W. 697 (1901) ; State v Billings,
140 Mo. 193, 41 S.W. 778 (1897); State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 135, 1 S.W. 135
(1886); State v. Simms, 71 Mo. 538 (1880); State v. Kring, 11 Mo. App. 92
(1881), affirmed 74 Mo. 612 (1883).

364. Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910); State v. Stallings, 334 Mo. 1,
64 S.W.2d 643 (1933).
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act is not deemed to be a violation of the Mlissouri Constitution of putting
a man twice in jeopardy. Nor is it deemed to violate the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States."
XII. ApEAL BY TK

STATE

After jeopardy has attached in a criminal prosecution, the right of
appeal does not lie on behalf of the state to reverse a judgment rendered
in favor of the defendant because the effect of such an action would be to
subject the defendant to a retrial after an acquittal, and thus would be
putting the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense."' The only
exception to this rule is where the right to appeal is granted under, and
in accordance with, statutory provisions." 7
No rule of law is more firmly established in our criminal procedure
than the rule holding that the right of appeal is based upon statute, and
in the absence of a statute granting the right of appeal, no such right
exists.' A statute which gives the state a full right of appeal in criminal
cases is not unconstitutional as being against the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment nor in derogation of the privileges and immunity
clauses of the Federal Constitution!'
The right of the state to appeal in Missouri is governed by section
547.200 and section 547.210."' The former statute sets forth that: "The
state, in any criminal prosecution, shall be allowed an appeal only in the
cases and under the circumstances mentioned in section 547.210." The
state's right to appeal under this latter enactment extends only to appealing
from sustained demurrers or exceptions to allegedly insufficient indictments or informations or when judgments thereon are arrested or set aside

365. State v. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S.W. 697 (1901); Brantley v. Georgia,
supra n. 364.
366. United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 (1909); Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333 (1907); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892); State v.
Hughes, 223 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. 1949); State v. Copeland, 65 Mo. 497 (1877).
367. State v. Hughes, supra n. 366; State v. Hunter, 198 S.W.2d 544 (Mo.
1946); State v. Reisman, 225 Mo. App. 637, 37 S.W.2d 675 (1931); State v.
Craig, 223 Mo. 201, 122 S.W. 1006 (1909); State v. Beagless, 174 Mo. 624, 74
S.W. 851 (1903).
368. State v. Hunter, supra n. 367; State v. Hughes, supra n. 366; State v.
Pottinger, 287 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1956).

369. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
370. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
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for insufficiencies. " ' Even then, the right of appeal is hampered in its
2
exercise by the discretion of the trial court. 1
To enlarge the right of the state so as to entitle it to a new trial whenever in the course of the trial a material error has been made to the prejudice
of the state would necessitate an amendment of the Missouri Constitution
which specifically provides that, "no person after being once acquitted by
a jury be again for the same offense put in jeopardy of life or liberty.""
In view of this constitutional provision, even if the state would secure a
reversal on appeal, the defendant could not be retried by the state, because
to do so would be putting the defendant in jeopardy for a second time.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The plea of former jeopardy is neither new nor is it strange to the law.
It is as old as justice but as fresh as virtue itself and, like freedom, needs
constant vigilance. This is illustrated by the fact that this plea arose at
a time when the liberties and rights of man were subordinated to the rights
assumed by the government. The constant fear that these liberties and
rights will again be subordinated has nurtured the retention of this constitutional provision.
Now that the rights and liberties of the individual appear to be secure
from governmental encroachment, some legal writers have given vent to the
idea that the plea of former jeopardy should be revised so as to conform
to present conditions. By a convenient, but highly misleading sophistry,
these writers maintain that in the prosecution of a criminal cause the state
be placed on an equal premise with the accused. From this postulate flows
such changes as the right of the state to appeal from a criminal judgment
in the same manner as the accused.

371. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 547.210 (1949): "When any indictment or information
is adjudged insufficient upon demurrer or exception, or where judgment thereon
is arrested or set aside, the court in which the proceedings were had, either
from its own knowledge or from information given by the prosecuting attorney

that there is reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant can be convicted

of an offense, if properly charged, may cause the defendant to be committed or
recognized to answer a new indictment or information, or if the prosecuting
attorney prays an appeal to the appellate court, the court may, in its discretion,
grant an appeal." Supreme Court Rules 28.04.
372. Section 547.210, supra.
373. Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19 (1945); Replogle, Double Jeopardy-Appeal by
the State as Subjecting Defendant to Double Jeopardy, 7 MONTANA L. REV. 56
(1946); Johnson, Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy and the Right of the
State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 337.
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There are two reasons why an equality between the prosecutor and
the accused can never exist in the trial of a criminal case: 1) according
to the Declaration of Independence and the fundamental philosophy of
our country, the government was instituted not with rights paramount or
even equal to the rights of an individual but for the protection of the
rights of an individual; thus the rights inherent in an individual are
superior to any rights which inure to the government; and, 2) only the
accused is placed in jeopardy of life or liberty, the state never being subjected to that awesome circumstance.
In view of these facts, before any emasculation is effectuated in the
plea of former jeopardy, it should be remembered that since the time
Hammurabi published his code "to hold back the strong from oppressing
the weak" the success of any legal system and the civilization which it
governs has been measured not by the stringency of the laws, nor the
percentage of convictions, but by its fidelity to the universal idea of
justice.
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